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Outsourcing is a growing modern method of conducting business. The reach of s 197 
of the Labour Relations Act in outsourcing has sparked debate and controversy in the 
legal community. Albeit settled that s 197 may apply to initial outsourcing 
transactions, a lengthy litigation battle resulted in the recent seminal Constitutional 
Court judgment of Aviation Union of South Africa and other v South African Airways 
(Pty) Ltd. The Constitutional Court pronounced on the application of s 197 to second 
generation outsourcing. This judgment is not without limitation and presents 
interpretational issues that will affect the scope and application of s 197 in the 
outsourcing context and which may undermine the purpose of s 197.  
The enquiry as to whether there is a transfer as a going concern as provided in 
s 197(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, and as interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court in National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape 
Town and Others, creates a reasoning anomaly when applied in the outsourcing 
context. 
 A theoretical examination of the implementation of the provisions of s 197 
when applied in the outsourcing sector questions the suitability of such provisions. 
The structure of s 197 fails to account for the economic realities and the dynamics of 
the legal relationships which define an outsourcing transaction. The practical 
difficulties associated with the implementation of s 197 can negatively impact the 
growth of the outsourcing marketplace. These practical difficulties need to be 
resolved through the amendment of s 197 in order to ensure that the application of s 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OUTSOURCING AND S 197  
The practice of outsourcing is an increasingly growing modern method of business 
delivery both globally and locally.1 This statement finds support and is highlighted 
through various surveys conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Norton Rose and 
KPMG.  Drawing on the results from a 2008 global outsourcing survey, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers emphasized the increased role of outsourcing in a 
company’s agenda. 2 In 2011 a survey conducted by Norton Rose noted that the 
economic recession had positively impacted the growth of the outsourcing market in 
both private and public sectors.3 In 2012 a survey conducted by KPMG concluded 
that the demands of the global market place have spurred organisations ‘…to 
transform the way they deliver their businesses and manage costs…’ through inter 
alia outsourcing.4  It further confirmed that outsourcing is on the up-rise in the South 
African market.5  
The trend to outsource and its growing role in the modern economy highlights 
the importance of a critical examination of the application of s 197 of the Labour 
Relations Act6 to outsourcing transactions and the suitability of the current 
provisions in facilitating an outsourcing transaction subject to s 197.  
                                                
1 Carolyn Sutherland and Joellen Riley ‘Industrial Legislation in 2009’ (2010) 50 Journal of Industrial 
Relations 275 at 284; Trent D Sebbens ‘Wake, O Wake - Transmission of Business Provisions in 
Outsourcing and Privatisation’ (2003) 16 Australian Journal of Labour Law 133 at 133-134 and 140-
141and Manoj Dias-Abey ‘Industrial Protection in the Era of Outsourcing’ (2009) 22 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 161 at 161. 
2 See the executive summary in Pricewaterhouse Coopers ‘Global Outsourcing: Outsourcing comes of 
age: The rise of collaborative partnering’ (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/operations-
consulting-services/oursourcing-comes-of-age.jhtml, accessed on 16 January 2013. 
3 See the executive summary in Norton Rose ‘A smart approach to outsourcing’, available at 
http://www.nortonrose.com/files/a-smart-approach-to-sourcing-ii-57727.pdf, accessed on 16 January 
2013. 
4 KPMG ‘KPMG South Africa Sourcing Advisory 2Q12 Pulse Survey’ at 3, available at 
www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/General-Industries-
Publications/Documents/Sourcing%20survey%20Launch.pdf, accessed on 16 January 2013. 
5 Ibid. 














Section 197 regulates the transfer of employment contracts when there is a 
transfer of a business as a going concern.7 If a transfer triggers s 197, the workforce 
of the transferring business automatically transfers to the ‘new employer’.8 The ‘new 
employer’, subject to certain mechanisms made available within the section, 
essentially steps into the shoes of the ‘old employer’, assuming all liabilities and 
obligations associated with the transferred workforce.9  
Section 197 was a response to correct the deficiencies under the common law, 
in which employees of a transferring business received no security of employment.10 
In the event of a transfer their employment terminated.11 The introduction of s 197 
gave content to the right to fair labour practice 12 enshrined in s 23 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.13  
In a judgment interpreting the original s 197, as was subsequently amended in 
2002, the Constitutional Court in National Education Health and Allied Workers 
Union v University of Cape Town and Others 14 (hereinafter referred to as UCT) held 
that the purpose of s 197 
… is to protect the employment of the workers and to facilitate the sale of businesses 
as going concerns by enabling the new employer to take over the workers as well as 
other assets in certain circumstances. The section aims at minimising the tension and 
the resultant labour disputes that often arise from the sales of businesses and impact 
negatively on economic development and labour peace. In this sense, section 197 
has a dual purpose; it facilitates the commercial transactions while at the same time 
protecting the workers against unfair job losses.15 
                                                
7 Section 197(1). 
8 Section 197(2). The terminology ‘new employer’ and ‘old employer’ is used in s 197(1) (b). 
9 Section 197 (2) read with subsecs (3), (6) and (7).  
10 Lynn Briggs ‘The Application of Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act in an Outsourcing 
Context’ (Part 1) 2008 Obiter 425 at 429-430. 
11Ibid. 
12 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and others (2003) 
24 ILJ 95 (CC) paras 33-43.  
13 NO. 108 of 1996. (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) 
14 Supra note 12. 














Furthermore this dual purpose reflects the conflicting tensions between  
… on the one hand, the employer’s interest in the profitability, efficiency or survival 
of the business, or if need be its effective disposal of it, and the worker’s interest in 
job security and the right to freely choose an employer on the other hand.16 
The employer’s interest is heightened in the context of a modern economy where 
businesses are under extreme pressure to remain competitive and flexible in a global 
market to ensure their longevity and survival. 17   
At first glance s 197 appears uncomplicated. As long as there is a transfer of a 
business as a going concern, employees of the transferring entity will automatically 
transfer.  Its appearance is deceiving.18 As will become evident since its inception 
this section has intrigued and perplexed both judges and commentators as to its 
intended interpretation and scope.  Despite an amendment in 2002, its interpretation 
has continued to generate uncertainty.19 This paper focuses on the controversy that 
has followed its potential application in the outsourcing business arena, with specific 
reference to second generation outsourcing in light of the recent Constitutional Court 
judgment of Aviation Union of South Africa and other v South African Airways (Pty) 
Ltd.20 (hereinafter referred to as SAA).  
1.2. CHAPTER CONTENT   
Chapter two discusses the judgment of COSAWU v Zikhethele Trade (Pty) Ltd 21 
(hereinafter referred to as COSAWU) that sparked the second generation outsourcing 
controversy. It continues to critically analyse the Constitutional Court judgment of 
SAA by critiquing the reasoning of the majority, and identifying interpretational 
issues that have arisen in its subsequent application in the case of Harsco Metals 
                                                
16 Ibid para 52. Also see ibid para 70. This tension is acknowledged in respect of comparable 
provisions in foreign jurisdictions. See for example commentary on Australia’s comparable provision 
in Trent D Sebbens op cit note 1 at 165 and Manoj Dias-Abey op cit note 1 at 169. 
17 Trent D Sebbens op cit note 1 at 164 and Manoy Dias-Abey op cit note 1 at 169. 
18 Chris Todd, D’Arcy du Toit and Craig Bosch Business Transfers and Employment Rights (2004) at 
24. 
19 Ibid. 
20 2012 (1) SA 321 (CC).   














South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd 22(hereinafter 
referred to as Harsco). The chapter draws the conclusion that SAA may not be as 
final as commentators expected. 
Chapter three focuses on the problematic application of the test of a going 
concern, required by s 197(1) (b), and as defined by UCT, with consideration to the 
reasoning in Harsco. Drawing on commentary based on comparable foreign 
jurisprudence, the chapter concludes that the test of a going concern, in light of the 
reasoning as adopted in Harsco, is deficient and can ultimately undermine the aim of 
s 197 and negatively impact the outsourcing market. 
Chapter four addresses whether outsourcing should fall within the scope of s 
197. It tackles this issue by examining the practical implications of s 197 in the 
outsourcing context and the potential effect it has on the competitiveness and 
viability of the outsourcing sector.  
Chapter five highlights the uncertainty that still hangs over the application of s 
197 in the outsourcing context and calls for proactive intervention by the courts and 
the Legislature. 
1.3. TERMINOLOGY 
Reference to the following terms will have the assigned meaning, unless indicated 
otherwise:-  
• Initial outsourcing or first generation outsourcing shall refer to when a 
company, which has previously employed its own workforce to perform 
designated services, ceases to carry out such designated services and in so 
doing contracts with an external service provider to perform those same 
designated services.  
                                                















• Second generation outsourcing shall refer to when an initial outsourcing 
arrangement between a  company and a service provider is terminated or 
expires and the company, once putting the services out to tender, replaces 
the outgoing service provider with a new service provider.23  
• Future generation outsourcing shall refer to any subsequent outsourcing 
arrangement that follows a second generation outsourcing arrangement. 
• Outsourcing shall refer to the collective generations of outsourcing. 
• Insourcing shall refer to when a company terminates a contracting out 
agreement with a service provider and resumes the designated service 
itself. 
• Client shall refer to the company that:- 
a) benefits from the service of the service provider with which it 
concludes an outsourcing contract, or  
b) will be the beneficiary of the tendered contracted out service;  
     whichever the context indicates.  
The followings terms will be referred to interchangeably: 
• An initial service provider shall be referred to interchangeably as the old 
employer or outgoing contractor or transferee, whichever is the most 
suitable term within the given context. 
• A new service provider shall be referred to interchangeably as the new 
employer or incoming contractor or transferor, whichever is the most 
suitable term within the given context. 
  
                                                
23 Supra note 21 para 27. This term is also referred to by academic commentators as ‘second 














1.4. INTERNATIONAL INSIGHT  
1.4.1. COMPARABLE FOREIGN LEGISLATION 
The following were selected as the primary sources of foreign comparison where 
applicable: 
• The Acquired Rights Directive 24(hereinafter referred to as the EU Directive 
or Directive); 
• The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, 
as amended (hereinafter referred to as TUPE), and 
• The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
(hereinafter referred to as TUPE (2006)). 
Their selection was determined on the similarity of their counterpart provisions to 
that of s 197. Furthermore the Constitutional Court has recognised the value of such 
foreign jurisprudence.25 
Commentary and case law governing the application of the EU Directive, 
TUPE and TUPE (2006) in the context of outsourcing has been relied on to:- 
• forecast potential issues and practical implications that may arise in light of 
recent local case law developments in the sphere of second generation 
outsourcing, and 
• whether foreign experience produces viable solutions to potential problems 
that may arise through the application of s 197 to the outsourcing context 
which will be identified and discussed in the chapters to follow.  
  
                                                
24 The Acquired Rights Directive (also referred to as ARD) refers to Council Directive 77/187, 
amended by Directive 98/50/EC and consolidated in Directive 2001/23.  See Amie Jasmine 
Ahanchian ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible Hand on the Economy by 
Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provision’ (2002) 2 The Journal of 
International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent 29 at 51 for a brief discussion of the amendment 
and consolidation of the Directive. 














1.4.2. THE EU DIRECTIVE  
The EU Directive was first adopted in 1977.26 It was subsequently amended in 
199827 and finally consolidated in 2001.28 The EU Directive is ‘an approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the 
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses.’29 It regulates, inter alia, the automatic transfer of employment contracts 
in the event of transfer of a business.30   
The EU Directive places an obligation on member states of the European 
Union to transpose the Directive into its national law.31 In clarifying the scope and 
intent of the EU Directive, and in informing the national laws of the member states, 
the European community seeks clarification on the interpretation of the EU Directive 
from the European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the ECJ). This process 
involves referring a question of interpretation to the ECJ, which results in an opinion 
by an Advocate General, which is either confirmed or overruled by the ECJ.32 
Advocate Generals have the same status as that of the judges of the ECJ and their 
opinions have an influencing role on the decisions of the ECJ.33 This ECJ process is 
mentioned as certain seminal ECJ cases and Advocate General opinions, which have 
impacted the scope of the EU Directive in the outsourcing context, have been 
referred to in this paper due to their instructive content.34  
The comparable s 197 provision of the 2001 consolidated version of the EU 
Directive35 is found in Article 1 (a) and (b). It states that:  
                                                
26 Council Directive 77/187 of 14 February 1977. 
27 Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998. 
28 Directive 2001/23 of 12 March 2001. See commentary in Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris 
Labour Law (2012) at 234 -235 for a discussion as to the history and purpose of the EU Directive.  
29 See title of Directive 2001/23 supra note 28. 
30 Ibid at chapter II, article 3(1). 
31 Ibid at chapter IV. 
32 Peter Curwen ‘Prospects for Acquired Rights’ (1999) 77 (3) Public Administration 599 at 600. 
33 Malcolm Wallis ‘Judges: Servants of Justice or Civil Servants?’ (2012) 129 (4) South African Law 
Journal 652 at 661 and fn 35 at 661. 
34 Op cit note 32 at 600. 














(a) This Directive shall apply to any transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of 
an undertaking or business to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or 
merger. 
(b) Subject to subparagraph (a) and the following provisions of this Article, there is a 
transfer within the meaning of this Directive where there is a transfer of an economic 
entity which retains its identity, meaning an organised grouping of resources which 
has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that activity is 
central or ancillary.36 
1.4.3. TUPE AND TUPE (2006) 
Where applicable commentary surrounding the application of TUPE and TUPE 
(2006), by both foreign and local academics, has been referred to and applied by 
analogy. TUPE was, and TUPE (2006) is, the product of the United Kingdom’s 
implementation of the EU Directive. Therefore the aims and purposes are aligned.37 
Notably TUPE (2006) has replaced TUPE in its entirety.38  Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of TUPE, and its associated commentary, remains relevant in the 
context of this paper.39  
The scope of TUPE (2006) extends further than the scope of the EU Directive 
and TUPE.40 It aims to address the uncertainties that had arisen in the application of 
TUPE, as reflected in both local and EU case law, specifically with regard to the 
outsourcing context.41  In so doing TUPE (2006) incorporates a service provision 
change clause.42 
A service provision change occurs when there is an initial outsourcing 
transaction or a second generation outsourcing transaction or the insourcing of 
                                                
36 See the similar provision in supra note 27 at chapter II, article 3(1). 
37 See explanatory note of TUPE (2006). Also see Deakin and Morris op cit note 28 at 241. 
38 John McMullen ‘Service Provision Change Under TUPE: Not Quite What We Thought’ (2012) 14 
(4) Industrial Law Journal 471 at 472 and John McMullen ‘An Analysis of the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ (2006) 35 (2) Industrial Law Journal 
113 at 114. 
39 Op cit note 18 at 23-24.   
40 John McMullen (2012) op cit note 38 at 473 and John McMullen (2006) op cit note 38 at 114-115. 
41 Ibid. 














services.43 TUPE (2006) specifically excludes the ‘supply of goods for the client’s 
use.’44 On the occurrence of a service provision change the employment contracts of 
the workforce automatically transfer to the transferee.45  The provision is subject to 
the proviso that prior to the service provision change ‘an organised grouping of 
employees’ are based in Great Britain ‘which has as its principal purpose the 
carrying out of the activities concerned on behalf of the client’ and that it is the 
intention of the client that the after the service provision change the services will ‘be 
carried out by the transferee other than in connection with a single specific event or 
task of short-term duration.’46 
The service provision change clause in TUPE (2006) circumvents the 
application of the assessment as to whether there is  
…a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business 
situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to another person 
where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity.47 
The latter is comparable to that of s 197. A similar provision existed under TUPE.48 
Despite the seemingly unambiguous wording of the service provision change clause, 
its application has been a far reach from the vision of certainty which propelled its 
creation.49  
  
                                                
43 Regulation 3(1) (b). 
44 Regulation 3(3) (c). 
45 Regulation 4 (1). 
46 Regulation 3(3) (a). 
47 Regulation 3(1) (a), read with reg 3(2). In the event that the elements that comprise a service 
provision change in reg 3(3) are not filled, the transaction will be subject to the transfer of a 
undertaking test in reg 3(1)(a). For commentary see Giuseppe Santoro- Passarelli ‘The Transfer of 
Undertakings: Striking a Balance between Individual Workers Rights and Business Needs’ (2007) 23 
(3) The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 311at 345 
48 Vivien Shrubsall ‘Competitive Tendering, Out-sourcing and the Acquired Rights Directive’ (1998) 
6(1) The Modern Law Review 85 at 85. 
49 See generally John McMullen (2012) op cit note 38 which discusses the interpretational problems 














 CHAPTER 2: THE APPLICATION OF S 197 TO SECOND 
GENERATION OUTSOURCING 
2.1. INITIAL OUTSOURCING AND S 197 
It is generally accepted that s 197 may apply to an initial outsourcing transaction 
insofar as the elements of s 197 are satisfied.50 The latest debate in the applicability 
of s 197 to outsourcing transactions has centred on its application to second 
generation outsourcing and by implication that of future generations. The reference 
to such terms such as initial outsourcing and second generation outsourcing has been 
criticized by commentators and most recently by the Constitutional Court as being 
artificial and as misleading the nature of the enquiry.51 Despite such criticisms, for 
the sake of convenience, these terms shall be referred to with the meanings as 
assigned in chapter one. 
This chapter shall discuss and critique the relevant jurisprudence that has given 
content to the debate surrounding the application of s 197 to second generation 
outsourcing. 
2.2. TESTING THE WATERS - COSAWU V ZIKHETHELE TRADE (PTY) 
LTD AND ANOTHER 
2.2.1. BACKGROUND 
The case of COSAWU was the first reported case pronouncing on the application of s 
197 to second generation outsourcing.52  
                                                
50 See cases such as UCT supra note 12, SA Municipal Union and others v Rand Airport Management 
Co (Pty) Ltd and others (2006) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC), Buys v Impala Distributors and another (2008) 29 
ILJ 641 (LC). Also see Aviation Union of SA and others v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd (2008) 29 ILJ 331 
(LC) paras 23 and 32. For commentary see PAK Le Roux ‘Outsourcing and the LRA: When it is the 
transfer of a “going concern”?’ (2004) 14 (5) Contemporary Labour Law 41 and PAK Le Roux 
‘Outsourcing and the transfer of a business as a going concern’ (2007) 17 (4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 31. 
51 Supra note 20 para 105. Malcolm Wallis “Is Outsourcing in? An ongoing concern’ (2006) 27 ILJ 1 
at 4. 














The facts of the case were briefly as follows:53  Fresh Produce Terminals (FPT) 
outsourced its terminal and stevedoring services to Khulisa.54 This constituted the 
initial outsourcing arrangement.55 FPT terminated its contract with Khulisa (the 
outgoing contractor), and following a tendering of the services, awarded the contract 
to Zikhethele Trade (the incoming contractor).56 Following the appointment of 
Zikhethele, the applicant, being the registered trade union representing 181 
employees of Khulisa, sought an urgent declaratory order that s 197 applied to the 
outsourcing transaction appointing Zikhethele.57  
2.2.2. THE COURT’S FINDINGS 
The Labour Court held that second generation transfers fell within the ambit of s 
197.58 Adopting a purposive approach to the language of s 197,59 it determined that 
the language of s 197(1) (b) did not preclude second generation transfers being 
subject to s 197.60 The court accepted that ‘by’ in the phrase ‘…transfer of a business 
by one employer (the old employer) to another employer (the new employer) as a 
going concern’61 should be read as ‘from’.62 It held that such an approach avoided 
any anomaly that s 197 applied to pr tect employees of an initial outsourcing 
transaction and not employees of a second generation outsourcing transaction.63  The 
court’s construction of the language was an attempt to circumvent the argument that 
the language of s 197 (1)(b) exempts second generation outsourcing as the nature of 
such transaction precludes there being a transfer of a business which is effected ‘by 
                                                
53 For a comprehensive summary of the intricate facts of the case see PAK Le Roux ‘Outsourcing and 
the transfer of employees to another employer: what happens in the “second Generation” 
Transfer?’(2005) 14 (12) Contemporary Labour Law 111 at 112-113. 
54 Supra note 21 para 11. The entity Khulisa was a result of a merger of three different entities which 
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the old employer’.64 In other words, such an argument purports that the transfer is 
effective by the client, who is not the old employer, and not by the outgoing 
contractor, who is the old employer.65 If was further accepted that the absence of a 
contractual link between the old employer and the new employer does not preclude 
the possible application of s 197.66 
Relying on EU jurisprudence,67 the court formulated a two stage transfer test. 68 
Such a construction contemplated a transfer from the outgoing contractor to the 
client which precedes a transfer from the client to the incoming contractor.69 In the 
court’s opinion this formulation of a transfer, in combination with the interpretation 
of ‘by’ to mean ‘from’, brought the tripartite relationship structure associated with 
second generation outsourcing within the scope of a ‘transfer’ as envisaged by s 
197(1)(b).70  Shifting the enquiry away from the mode or method of transfer, the 
court held that the main issue for determination was whether ‘what is transferred is a 
business in operation so that the business rem ins the same but in different hands.’71 
2.2.3. THE APPLICATION OF S 197 
Having determined the possible application of s 197 to a second generation 
outsourcing arrangement, the court proceeded to investigate whether the facts 
triggered s 197, namely whether there was a transfer of a business as a going 
concern.72 The following facts were pertinent to the court’s finding:  
• the incoming and outgoing contractors shared the same managing director 
who, in addition, had a controlling interest in both entities;  
• Zikhethele took over the majority of Khulisa employees; 
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66 Supra note 21 para 28. 
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• Zikhethele used the same premises, fittings and equipment which were at 
Khulisa’s disposal; 
• Khulisa utilised some of Zikhethele’s suppliers; 
• the client was the major incorporeal asset of both entities; and  
• there was similarity in their corporate structures.73  
Accepting that a two stage transfer had occurred,74 the court drew on the above 
listed facts to conclude that the facts triggered s 197.75 Specifically a comparison of 
the two entities before and after the award of the tender resulted in the business 
retaining ‘…its identity to a sufficient degree as to constitute a transfer of a 
business.’ 76  
2.2.4. ACADEMICS RESPOND TO COSAWU  
Le Roux regarded COSAWU as authority for two propositions.77 First that the word 
‘by’ does not limit the application of s 197 to second generation outsourcing. 
Secondly that outsourcing does not automatically trigger s 197 but rather the facts are 
subject to a s 197 enquiry.78 Bosch commended the case in its attempt at furthering 
the right to fair labour practices, the purpose of the LRA and specifically s 197.79  
Despite such flattery the case was subjected to severe criticism.80 In particular 
the two stage transfer test was regarded as unnecessary. It was argued that the court’s 
interpretation of ‘by’ to mean ‘from’ was suffice to conclude the application of s 197 
to second generation outsourcing.81 Coupled with the court’s comments as to the 
irrelevancy of the mode or method of transfer left how the transfer occurred of no 
significance.82 The two stage transfer test was deemed an artificial construction 
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80 Op cit note 53 at 115 and Wallis op cit note 51 at 11-18. 
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which lacked factual relevance and contradicted the court’s reasoning.83  In applying 
the two stage transfer test the client would become the old employer and the 
incoming contractor would become the new employer despite the court concluding 
that the transfer occurred between the outgoing and incoming contractor.84 
Wallis, inter alia, critiqued the court’s re-interpretation of the word ‘by’. He 
regarded it as unnecessary without an in-depth investigation.85 He argued that the 
court had changed the intended meaning of the Legislature from a transferor taking 
positive action to affect a transfer, to a passive transferor permitting a transfer out of 
helpless compliance or inadvertence.86 Despite the appeal of a purposive approach to 
interpretation,87 Wallis suggested that it is reasonable to accept that the Legislature 
intended to exclude transactions such as second generation outsourcing from the 
scope of s 197.88 Furthermore he was of the opinion that the facts of the case did not 
justify the court’s interference with the plain meaning of the language.89 Wallis 
advocated a constitutional challenge as the appropriate means to develop the 
application of s 197.90 
2.2.5. THE UPRISE OF LITIGATION FOLLOWING COSAWU  
The judgment of COSAWU was tested in the Labour Court case of Aviation Union of 
SA and others v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd. 91 (hereinafter referred to as SAA LC) SAA LC 
dealt with the applicability of s 197 to second generation outsourcing. COSAWU was 
distinguished and not followed. Despite acknowledging the value in the purposive 
approach taken by COSAWU, the Labour Court deemed it to be unwarranted.92 It 
stated: 
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Whilst I am in agreement with Murphy AJ [the judgment of COSAWU] that workers 
affected by a second generation transfer may well equally be in need of protection, I 
am not persuaded that, in the light of the express and unambiguous wording of s 
197(1)(b), it would be appropriate to interpret s 197(1)(b) also to apply to a transfer 
'from' one employer to another as opposed to a transfer by the 'old' employer to the 
'new' employer. I am of the view that it should be left to the legislature to extend the 
ambit of s 197(1) (b) to apply also to the so-called second generation transfers. 93 
The Labour Court’s rejection of a purposive approach was motivated by a lack 
of ambiguity in the wording of s 197. The lack of ambiguity was indicative of the 
intention of the Legislature to exclude second generation outsourcing.94 The 
judgment however failed to expand on and explain the basis of its absolute certainty 
as to the Legislature’s intention.95 A conclusion which curtails the reach and purpose 
of a statutory provision, the importance of which is recognised by the court, requires 
explanation and justification rather than a mere declaration.  
The effect of the judgment was that it created a blanket exception to s 197 in 
respect of second generation outsourcing.96  Notably the two stage transfer test of 
COSAWU was not referred to. The judgment appears inconsistent at times. First, 
despite the court rejecting the application of second generation outsourcing, it 
nonetheless recognises the limited value of COSAWU.  This implies, due to the 
nature of the transaction involved in COSAWU, a limited application of s 197 to 
second generation outsourcing.97 The judgment omits to explain why the limited 
reach of COSAWU does not apply to the facts of the case.98 Secondly, the court 
appears to entertain the application of an insourcing transaction on the facts without 
distinguishing it from the appointment of a new service provider or ascertaining its 
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application within s 197.99 Thirdly, the court accepted that there can be a transfer of a 
going concern in the absence of a contractual nexus between the transferor and 
transferee.100 Bosch argues that in light of such a determination, the court failed to 
apply its own reasoning by simply not applying the test as to whether there was a 
transfer of a business as a going concern.101 
This judgment was taken on appeal. It proceeded to the Labour Appeal Court 
which in applying a purposive approach held that s 197 was applicable to second 
generation outsourcing.102 This judgment was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal which applied a literal approach and held that s 197 was not applicable to 
second generation outsourcing.103  Finally the matter reached the Constitutional 
Court which led to the pronouncement that s 197 may apply to second generation 
outsourcing.104 The details of this litigation battle will be discussed in the section to 
follow.    
2.3. THE SECOND GENERATION OUTSOURCING BATTLE 
2.3.1.  DETERMINING THE LAW 
Following a trilogy of conflicting decisions dealing with the permissibility of s 197 
to second generation outsourcing arrangements, the Constitutional Court in SAA 
pronounced that second generation outsourcing may fall within the ambit of s 197.105  
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the meaning of ‘transfer’ does not preclude 
second generation transfers triggering s 197, conversely it does not mean that second 
generation transfers will automatically trigger s 197.106 Discarding generation labels 
assigned to transactions, it held that what is relevant is whether the facts of a 
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particular case satisfy the elements embodied in s 197, namely whether there is 
‘transfer’, of a ‘business’, ‘as a going concern’, triggering the application of the 
section.107 
It is notable that the minority judgment, written by Jafta J and the majority 
judgment, written by Yacoob J, concurred on the legal issue as to whether s 197 
applied to second generation outsourcing. They differed as to whether the court could 
engage in a s 197 enquiry prior to the transfer actually occurring and whether the 
facts presented were sufficient to conclude the application of s 197. The minority 
held that an order as to the application of s 197 on the facts was premature as the 
facts presented were insufficient and ‘did not cover the events that occurred after the 
date on which the outsourcing agreement was terminated.’108 It was of the opinion 
that the matter be remitted back to the labour court.109 The majority differed in that it 
did not require that a transfer ‘must have already taken place’110 before making a s 
197 order or that the facts presented were insufficient.111 It held that there was a 
transfer of a business as a going concern following an analysis of the effects of the 
relevant provisions of the outsourcing agreement which existed between the client 
and the outgoing contractor.112 
2.3.2. THE FACTS  OF SAA 
In assessing the impact and scope of SAA regard must be given to the context in 
which the case was decided. 
South African Airways (SAA) transferred its facilities management operations 
to LGM.113 SAA employees linked to the management operations were transferred to 
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LGM.114 Salient features of the outsourcing agreement concluded between SAA and 
LGM in respect of the management operations included, inter alia:- 
• LGM would enjoy the use of ‘the office space, workshops, airport aprons, 
computers and the SAA network at all designated airports’;115 
• The assets and inventory associated with the management operations was 
sold to LGM, and which SAA on termination of the agreement would be 
entitled to repurchase;116  
• On termination of the agreement, ‘SAA would be entitled to have the services 
transferred back to it or to a third party and obtain assignment of all third 
party contracts from LGM’117 and 
• LGM was required to develop a handover plan to effect the cancellation.118 
SAA prematurely, and lawfully, cancelled the outsourcing agreement due to a 
change in ownership in LGM. Failing confirmation from either SAA or LGM that its 
members’ employment would be safeguarded, Aviation Union sought a declaratory 
order and interdictory relief securing their members’ employment following the 
termination under s 197.119 
2.3.3. CASE LAW HISTORY  
The SAA LC decision has been discussed in detail in a prior section of this chapter.  
For sake of clarity the Labour Court declared a blanket exemption against second 
generation outsourcing applying to s 197.120  
Taken on appeal, the Labour Appeal Court121 rejected and criticized the literal 
approach of the SAA LC.122 In applying a purposive approach it determined that 
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second generation outsourcing was within the scope of s 197, and specifically within 
the facts of the case.123 Rejecting the Labour Court’s assertion that the word ‘by’ 
requires a positive role by the transferor, it argued that such a literal interpretation 
had excluded a range of meanings associated with the word ‘by’.124 The related 
meanings countered the necessity for a positive actor and permitted the inference of 
the word ‘from’.125 It held that a purposive approach promoted the purpose of s 197 
and prevented employers circumventing the application of s 197.126 It concluded that 
there existed no barrier to the application of s 197 to second generation 
outsourcing.127 
It is noteworthy that in 2010, after the judgment of SAA LAC, the Department 
of Labour published by way of General Notice the Labour Relations Amendment 
Bill, 2010.128  The Bill sought, inter alia, to amend s 197 (1) (b) by deleting the word 
‘by’ in the phrase transfer ‘…by one employer (‘the old employer’) to another 
employer (‘the new employer’)…’ and the inserting the word ‘from’.  The purpose of 
such amendment was to bring second generation transfers within the ambit of s 
197.129 The change was however never effected.130   
                                                                                                                                     
and the effect of each approach on the application and purpose of s 197. See specifically his 
preference for the purposive approach at ibid paras 31-32. 
123 Ibid paras 61-62. 
124 See ibid paras 56-57 where the court stated that:- 
The word 'by' holds a number of different meanings, including 'indicating the 
medium, means, instrument or agency, of circumstance, condition, manner, cause, reason' 
(the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1). An examination of the multiple meanings of 
the word 'by' indicates that the confident assertion that the literal interpretation of this section 
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connotation that the transferor has to play an immediate, positive role in bringing about the 
transfer. [own emphasis added] 
125 Ibid para 57. Also see John Grogan ‘Section 197 and Outsourcing: No magic to the ‘generation’’ 
(2012) 28 (3) Employment Law 4 at 5. 
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128 General Notice No.33873, available at 
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Notwithstanding the proposed amendment, the Labour Appeal Court’s 
judgment was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.131 The majority 
reverted to a literal approach as to the interpretation of s 197, as advanced by the 
Labour Court. It accepted that the word ‘by’ requires positive action by the transferor 
which is lacking in second generation outsourcing.132  It held that the decision of the 
Labour Appeal Court had distorted the intended meaning of the word ‘by’ in 
equating it with the word ‘from’, and overemphasised the potential for abuse where 
none existed on the facts.133  It is noted that dismissing the abuse argument due to a 
lack of evidence on the facts is narrow sighted in it ignores the broader application of 
the judgment. 
The minority judgment, adopting a purposive approach to s 197,134  avoided the 
debate surrounding the interpretation of the word ‘by’.  It deemed it unnecessary in 
light of the facts of the case.135  It focused on the fact that there existed a contract that 
created a positive obligation on the transferor to ‘positively assist’ in effecting a 
transfer.136  
2.4. THE APPLICATION OF SAA  
The first judgment to apply the Constitutional Court decision of SAA was that of 
Harsco Metals South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Arcelormittal South Africa Limited 
(hereinafter referred as a Harsco).137 The facts are briefly as follows. The applicant, 
Harsco Metals (HM), provided slag management and processing services (the 
Services) to Acerlormittal SA (AMSA) subject to six service agreements (the 
Agreements).138  Their relationship resulted from a joint venture between the two 
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companies.139  In discharging the Services, HM employed 445 employees and 
deployed its services from four sites and operated related plants.140   
Prior to the expiry of five of the Agreements AMSA commenced the tendering 
process for the Services.141 The second respondent (Phoenix) and the third 
respondent (Tube City) were appointed to provide the Services to AMSA at specific 
sites, to the exclusion of HM.142  
Following the termination of the relevant Agreements, AMSA was to purchase 
certain assets from HM, which excluded HM’s plants, part of which it was to retain 
for itself and part of it which it was to sell on to Phoenix and Tube City.   It was 
common cause that Phoenix and Tube City were willing to employ 300 of HM’s 445 
employees, which excluded HM’s head office staff and two site managers.143  
HM sought an urgent declaratory order to confirm the application of s 197 to 
the continuation of the Services by Phoenix and Tube City.144  The court had to 
decide whether there would be a transfer of a business as a going concern from HM 
to Phoenix and Tube City due to the termination of the relevant Agreements and the 
subsequent appointment of Phoenix and Tube City. The application was opposed by 
AMSA, Phoenix and Tube City.145 
The Harsco judgment brings to the forefront critical interpretation issues of 
SAA which are discussed in the section to follow.  
2.5. ANALYSIS OF SAA  
The below discussion identifies and discusses three interpretational issues associated 
with SAA which has arisen through the judgment’s application in Harsco. The three 
identified issues are: - the role of the history of the transaction, the application of the 
majority’s transfer test and the role of the take over of employees.  
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2.5.1. THE HISTORY OF THE TRANSACTION 
2.5.1.1. THE ISSUE 
Yacoob J, writing on the behalf of the majority in SAA, made the following 
observation:- 
The final general observation is that, in determining whether contracting out 
amounts to the transfer of a business as a going concern, the substance of the initial 
transaction, more specifically whether what is outsourced is a business as a going 
concern rather than the provision of an outsourced service remains significant during 
subsequent transfers. If the outsourcing institution from the outset did not offer the 
service, that service cannot be said to be part of the business of the transferor. What 
happens here is simple contracting out of the service, nothing more, nothing less.146 
There is no transfer of the business as a going concern. The outsourcee is contracted 
to provide the service, and becomes obliged to do so. And it is the outsourcee‘s 
responsibility to make appropriate business infrastructure arrangements. These may 
include securing staff, letting appropriate property for office or other work space, 
and acquiring fixed assets, machinery and implements, computers, computer 
networks and the like. Cancellation of the contract in these circumstances entails 
only that the outsourcee forfeits the contractual right to provide the service. The 
whole infrastructure for conducting the business of providing the outsourced service 
would ordinarily remain the property of the outsourcee. As we shall see, that is not 
what happened here, either when the initial outsourcing contract was concluded 
between SAA and LGM, or when SAA cancelled it.147  
If, on the other hand, the first outsourcing exercise is really a transfer of part of the 
business of the outsourcer who has been carrying on the business of the provision of 
the service until transfer, the question whether the subsequent transfer is merely the 
transfer of the right to provide the outsourced service or the transfer of a business as 
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a going concern would arise. And that would require an analysis of the terms of the 
transaction that gives rise to the subsequent event.148  
The debate arose in Harsco as to whether the above observation of the majority 
qualifies the possible application of s 197 to a second generation outsourcing 
transaction. In other words is it a prerequisite that the initial outsourcing transaction 
was a s 197 transfer, failing which the second generation outsourcing transaction will 
amount to a ‘simple contracting out of the services’. The cancellation of which 
would not constitute a s 197 transfer.149 
2.5.1.2. THE ARGUMENT  
In Harsco, the first respondent, namely AMSA, argued in favour of an interpretation 
that qualifies the application of s 197. 150 It argued that the application of s 197 to a 
second generation outsourcing transaction is qualifi d by the prerequisite that the 
initial outsourcing transaction constitutes a s 197 transfer. It argued that in the 
absence of an initial s 197 outsourcing transaction between AMSA and Harsco (the 
basis of their relationship was that of a joint venture),151 the cancellation of the 
Service Agreements amounted to a mere change of service provider.152  
 Judge Van Niekerk rejected153 and highlighted the implications of AMSA’s 
interpretation of SAA. 154  The details of which are discussed below. Notwithstanding 
the court dismissing AMSA’s argument, it distinguished the facts of the case from 
that detailed in Judge Yacoob’s observation.155  The facts in Harsco were 
distinguishable in that it did not amount to a ‘simple contracting out’ as contemplated 
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by Judge Yacoob.156 The consequence of the termination of the Service Agreements 
did not involve Harsco losing only a right to provide the service but resulted in a 
movement of assets and employees that irrespective of the history of the transaction 
required examination.157   
2.5.1.3. THE ANALYSIS 
It is submitted that the above detailed observation of the Constitutional Court is 
merely intended to define and detail the effects of a cancellation of a ‘simple 
contracting out’ of services, in principle, to contrast it against the factual scenario 
presented in SAA.158 The history of the initial outsourcing transaction is ‘significant’, 
the adjective used by the court, and not decisive,159 insofar as it red flags the 
background of the outsourcing arrangement. The background may trigger an 
investigation into any possible contractual obligations or undertakings, such as in 
SAA, that may or may not impact the elements that may trigger s 197.160 This line of 
reasoning is compatible with the facts of SAA where contractual provisions stemming 
from the initial outsourcing relationship triggered the application of s 197.161 The 
observation should be interpreted as to clarify the enquiry in the context of the facts 
of SAA.162   
Admittedly the Constitutional Court’s observation lacks clarity in 
contextualising the observation and the scope of its application. Nonetheless this 
paper supports the reasoning and conclusion of Judge Van Niekerk who dismissed 
AMSA’s interpretation as it failed to  not only account for the purposive 
interpretation of the majority judgment, but countered previous decisions of the 
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Labour Appeal Court and Constitutional Court which advocated a transaction 
specific examination in the assessment of whether s 197 applied.163 
It is argued that if an initial outsourcing agreement were a prerequisite to 
launching a s 197 enquiry the reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s judgment 
would be nonsensical. Both the majority and minority judgment in SAA disregard the 
use of ‘labels’ in a given transaction, preferring substance over form.164 Creating an 
exception to the applicability of s 197 by determining the exception based on the 
occurrence of an initial outsourcing transaction places form over substance. This 
leaves the transaction exempt from scrutiny due to its classification/labelling. 
In rejecting the labelling of generations of outsourcings and focusing the true 
nature of the enquiry as to whether there is a transfer of a business as a going 
concern,165 the majority judgment of SAA went on to state that:- 
A transfer of business may not be covered by section 197 even if it is a ‘first 
generation’ contracting out. On the other hand, even a ‘fifth generation’ outsourcing 
could be caught by the section if it is in reality the transfer of a business as a going 
concern.166  
The above quotation highlights the inadequacy of AMSA’s argument in 
Harsco that the majority’s observation in SAA creates a qualification.167 If AMSA’s 
submission were correct then a fifth generation outsourcing transaction can only be 
caught by s 197 if the first generation outsourcing transaction triggered s 197. This 
outcome contradicts the above quoted statement of the majority.  The above quote of 
the majority clearly expresses the idea that a first generation outsourcing transaction 
may escape s197, yet a fifth generation outsourcing may be caught by s197. This is 
because the true nature of the enquiry is whether there has been a transfer of a 
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business as a going concern.168 Therefore the very words and reasoning of the 
majority indicate it did not intend any qualification by its observation. 
In summation the absence of an initial s 197 outsourcing transaction should not 
elevate a transaction above the safeguards imposed by s 197. To do so would 
contradict the reasoning applied in SAA. It is respectfully submitted that such an 
exception if intended would have been unambiguous and expressly justified. 
Following the reasoning of Judge Van Niekerk’s in Harsco there appears to be no 
justification to allow a transaction, irrespective of its facts, to escape a s 197 enquiry 
based on the arbitrary condition that there exists an initial s 197 outsourcing 
transaction. 169  It remains to be seen whether this issue will be the subject of further 
litigation in an attempt by employers to circumvent the application of s 197 in the 
second generation outsourcing context. 
2.5.2. THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT’S TWO STAGE TRANSFER TEST  
The majority judgment in SAA characterised the main issue in dispute as ‘whether the 
transfer was one by an old employer to a new one’.170 In other words, who was 
effecting the transfer?171  This stemmed from the heated debate surrounding the word 
‘by’ in s 197(1) (b) that occurred in the labour court, labour appeal court and the 
supreme court of appeal, as previously discussed. 
The majority in SAA held that the concepts of old employer and new employer 
were not static i  application.172 The old employer in an initial outsourcing 
transaction does not remain the old employer throughout successive outsourcing 
transactions. The identity of the old and new employer is to be applied within the 
context of a given transaction. Having introduced the dynamic application of the 
identity of old and new employers, the majority fleetingly determined that the word 
‘by’ be assigned its ordinary meaning.173 The majority then proceeded to establish a 
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test as to whether there is a transfer by an old employer to a new employer.174 In 
establishing whether there is a transfer, a two stage enquiry was devised.  It stated the 
following:- 
Does the transaction concerned create rights and obligations that require one entity 
to transfer something in favour or for the benefit of another or to another? If so, does 
the obligation imposed within a transaction, fairly read, contemplate a transferor 
who has the obligation to effect a transfer or allow a transfer to happen, and a 
transferee who receives the transfer? If the answer to both these questions is in the 
affirmative, then the transaction contemplates transfer by the transferor to the 
transferee. Provided that this transfer is that of a business as a going concern, for 
purposes of section 197, the transferee is the new employer and the transferor the 
old. The transaction attracts the section and the workers will enjoy its protection. 175 
In the above enquiry the transferor is the old employer and the transferee is the 
new employer.176 Furthermore provided that there is a transferor, the identity of the 
transferee is of no relevance.177 This type of enquiry departs from the wide scope of a 
transfer preferred by the minority in SAA.178 It permits the court to interpret rights 
and obligations flowing from a transaction or an agreement prior to the actual 
transaction being implemented.179 Despite the majority determining there was a 
transfer by an old employer to a new employer on the facts of case, the application of 
this two stage transfer test to the facts of the case is not clearly reflected in the 
judgment. 
The question that naturally follows is how will this two stage transfer test be 
applied in future cases? Harsco failed to bring the majority’s two stage transfer test 
                                                                                                                                     
This judgment holds broadly that a permissible meaning of the word ‘by’ inevitably leads to 
the construction of the section favoured by the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), and that it is 
unnecessary to equate the word ‘by’ with ‘from’ and conclude that a transfer from one person 
or entity to another suffices for purposes of section 197.  
174 Ibid para 113. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid para 114. 
177 Ibid para 124. 
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to life. Judge Van Niekerk adopted the minority’s interpretation as to the 
establishment of a transfer.180 Therefore the scope and implications of the majority’s 
two stage transfer test needs to be examined in theory.   
Applying the transfer test to the facts of SAA the scope of the first question 
needs to be assessed.181 In SAA the outsourcing agreement between SAA and LGM 
created a contractual obligation that LGM would inter alia transfer assets and 
develop a handover plan to either SAA or the appointed service provider. Therefore 
the first stage of the transfer test is answered in the affirmative.  Considering the 
second stage of the transfer test, 182 the facts contemplate LGM as a transferor and 
SAA or a third party as the transferee. The ultimate identity of the transferee being 
irrelevant. As both questions are answered in the affirmative, in terms of the two 
stage transfer test there is a transfer by the old employer to the new employer. 
In the case of Harsco there existed no obligation, contractual or otherwise, on 
HM or any other party to transfer ‘something in favour or for the benefit of another 
or to another’.183 HM willingly sold part of its assets to AMSA. It was under no 
obligation to do so as a result of the cancellation of its outsourcing agreement with 
AMSA nor did AMSA have any right to the assets. There further existed no 
obligation on HM to deliver anything to or in favour of or for the benefit of the 
incoming contractors. The assets sold to AMSA were not sold to them for the 
purpose of resale to benefit the incoming contractors – such assets become the 
property of AMSA to dispose of as it desired. It is argued that the facts of Harsco fail 
at the first question of the two stage transfer test. As such there exists no transfer by 
an old employer to a new employer. This conclusion contradicts the finding of the 
Judge Van Niekerk, who relied on the minority’s determination as to a transfer. It is 
                                                
180 Supra note 22 paras 22-24. 
181 Supra note 20 para 113, where forsake of clarity, the first stage of the transfer tests asks, ‘Does the 
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favour or for the benefit of another or to another?’ 
182 Ibid, where forsake of clarity, the second stage of the transfer tests proceeds to asks, ‘If so, does the 
obligation imposed within a transaction, fairly read, contemplate a transferor who has the obligation to 















arguable that had Judge Van Niekerk applied the two stage transfer test of the 
majority it would have resulted in the s 197 enquiry terminating as this point.  
The case of Crossroads Distribution (Pty) Ltd t/a Jowells Transport v Clover 
SA (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Jowells)184 provides a further useful 
illustration as to the application of the two stage transfer test in the context of second 
generation outsourcing. Clover provided transport and logistics services to a client, 
Woodlands.185 Clover terminated the contract between it and Woodlands.186 
Woodlands appointed Crossroads as the new service provider. Clover sought a 
declaratory order that s 197 applied to the appointment of Crossroads while 
Woodlands sought a declaratory order that s 197 was not applicable.187 In order to 
provide the services Crossroads purchased additional milk tankers and as a result of 
the growth of its business, employed additional drivers, some of which were from 
Clover.188 Crossroads purchased certain items and structures from Clover and utilised 
one common place of business to that of Clover.189 Crossroads and Clover did not 
have any obligations, contractual or otherwise, to each other.190  
The facts of Jowells represent a second generation outsourcing transaction – an 
outgoing contractor is being replaced by an incoming contractor. The court in 
Jowells held that the facts amounted to change in service provider which was 
excluded from the scope of s 197.191  The court’s conclusion seemingly based on its 
determination that s 197 did not apply to second generation outsourcing,192 despite its 
comment that where ‘the second business is so closely aligned to the first business 
that it is fact identical, s 197 may be applicable.’193  
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Disregarding the criticisms levelled against Jowells,194 the facts of the case 
applied to the two stage transfer test yield the same end result as that of the Jowells 
judgment.195  There seemingly existed no contractual obligation on Clover to transfer 
anything to Crossroads or Woodlands on termination of the outsourcing arrangement, 
nor did the latter parties have a right to receive transfer of anything. As such the first 
stage of the transfer test would fail. Accordingly the facts of Jowells would escape s 
197 on the application of two stage transfer test.196 
It remains to be seen how generously phrases such as ‘in favour’ and ‘for the 
benefit of’, which are used in the first stage of the majority’s transfer test, will be 
interpreted to satisfy the enquiry to catch outsourcing transactions that at first glance 
appear to fall outside the scope of the transfer test.  
The above discussion of the majority’s two stage transfer test highlights the 
contextual background against which the transfer test is cast. SAA concerned an 
initial outsourcing transaction which was subject to s 197. There existed an 
outsourcing contract which imposed unambiguous contractual obligations on the 
outgoing contractor, and rights on the client and potential incoming contractor on the 
termination of the outsourcing agreement.197 It is argued that the majority’s transfer 
test is limited in that it is tailored to such facts. In the context of second generation 
outsourcing, and arguably future generations, there seldom exists a relationship 
between an outgoing and an incoming contractor that creates rights and obligations 
to satisfy the first stage of the transfer enquiry.198  Therefore the two stage transfer 
test may narrow the potential application of s 197 to ‘conventional’ second 
generation outsourcing transactions which are distinguishable from the facts of 
SAA.199  
                                                
194 An analysis of Jowells is not within the scope of this paper.  For further commentary see op cit 
note 95 at 164. 


















Bosch proposes a further criticism against the majority’s two stage transfer 
test.200 He argues that the test fails to clarify ‘when will the transferor have done 
enough that it can be said that the transfer was by such person?’201 In other words, is 
it required that the outgoing contract transfer just some of the elements of his 
business, irrespective of their value and relevance, or does he have to transfer 
significant or even all of the elements of his business.202 The majority’s transfer test 
provides no guidance and is vague in its reference to ‘…transfer something in 
favour…’203[own emphasis added] Bosch argues that debate will arise as to the 
preferred approach - a broad approach requiring something, irrespective of value and 
purpose, to transfer or a narrow approach requiring assets of importance and/or value 
to transfer.204  There will be additional challenges to such debates in ensuring courts 
and academics to not fall victim to ‘…a highly artificial debate about degree and 
proportion’,205 leading to the manipulation of the application of s 197 and preferring 
form over substance.206   
Consequently Bosch argues that the majority has failed to settle when a 
transfer occurs by an old employer.207 He argues that the majority’s formulation as to 
when there is a transfer by an old employee to a new old employee as embodied in 
the two stage transfer test has the potential to limit the scope of s 197.208 Arguably 
the majority’s transfer test could be seen as an attempt to intentionally limit the scope 
of s 197 within second generation outsourcing.  
The above discussed issues associated with the majority’s transfer test in SAA 
has the potential to lead to protracted and conflicting litigation in the pursuit of 
clarity and certainty. 
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2.5.2.1. THE MINORITY JUDGMENT’S TRANSFER ASSESSMENT  
Judge Van Niekerk applied the transfer approach of the minority judgment in SAA.209 
The minority of SAA held that:- 
For the section to apply the business must have changed hands, whether through a 
sale or other transaction that places the business in question in different hands. Thus 
the business must have moved from one person to the other. The breadth of the 
transfer contemplated in the section is consistent with the wide scope it is intended 
to cover. Therefore, confining transfers to those effected by the old employer is at 
odds with the clear scheme of the section.210  
Furthermore,  
But whether a transfer as contemplated in section 197 has occurred or will occur is a 
factual question. It must be determined with ref rence to the objective facts of each 
case.211 
and, 
For a transfer to be established there must be components of the original business 
which are passed on to the third party.212 
The minority’s statement on the transfer element glanced over the 
interpretation of ‘by’ in requiring only a ‘change of hands’ to effect a transfer.213 It 
adopted a broad and purposive interpretation of the language of s 197, unconfined by 
technical interpretations.214 Bosch supports the minority’s interpretation of the 
transfer test as it shifts the focus from the identity of the transferor, the central issue 
that the majority deemed to be relevant,215 to whether the business has transferred as 
                                                
209 See ibid at 169-170 where Bosch prefers the approach of the minority judgment in SAA in 
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a going concern.216 This Bosch argues supports the purpose of s 197 and the 
attainment of the right to fair labour practices.217 Bosch’s argument supports the 
views expressed in Todd et al which suggest it is irrelevant how the transfer 
occurred, what matters is whether the transaction concerns the transfer of a business 
as a going concern.218 This reasoning is in line with that in COSAWU.219 Despite the 
advantages of the minority determination of a transfer, the interpretation and 
application of the majority’s transfer test  remains relevant and of importance in 
determining the scope of the application of s 197 in outsourcing transactions. 
2.5.3. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYEES 
2.5.3.1. ‘A GOING CONCERN’ - THE CAUTIONARY ROLE OF 
EMPLOYEES 
 Judge Yacoob, in the majority judgment in SAA reaffirmed the test provided in UCT 
for what constitutes ‘a going concern’ within the phrase ‘transfer of a business as a 
going concern’.220 In accordance with the UCT test, ‘whether or not the employees 
are taken over by the new employer’ (the employee factor) is one factor, amongst 
others, used in the determination of ‘a going concern’,221 with no one single factor 
being regarded as determinative.222  
Judge Yacoob cautioned against the weight to be attached to the employee 
factor in ‘a going concern’ test.223 He stated that the purpose of s 197 is to compel 
the automatic transfer of employees when the business is transferred without its 
employees.224 Should a new employer take over the employees, on same or similar 
terms of employment, s 197 would have no application.225  He held that the weight to 
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be assigned to the transfer of employees by the new employer in the determination of 
a going concern may be limited and depend on the facts.226 
2.5.3.2. HEEDING SAA?  
With respect this flagging by Judge Yacoob eluded Judge Van Niekerk in Harsco. 
Judge Van Niekerk held that there was a transfer of a business as a going concern on 
the facts of the case. In assessing the criteria of a going concern, Van Niekerk 
referred to the test proposed in UCT, as reaffirmed by Judge Yacoob in SAA. Relying 
on EU jurisprudence and that of COSAWU,227 Judge Van Niekerk determined that 
the following factors were determinative of ‘a going concern’, namely:- 
• the degree of similarity of the activity before and after transfer,  
• the type of undertaking and  
• whether or not a majority of employe s had been taken over.228  
Judge Van Niekerk determined that there was ‘a going concern’ based on the 
accumulative weight that:- 
• the majority of HM’s employees would be employed by Phoenix and 
Tube City after the termination of the service agreements and  
• that the services performed by Phoenix and Tube City for AMSA were 
substantially similar to the services previously carried out by HM.229  
He assigned value to such factors based on the nature of the undertaking which he 
regarded as providing, 
…some useful indication of the weight to be attached particularly to the transfer of 
assets and whether any workers are taken over by the new employer, and if so, the 
number and significance of each.230 
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As mentioned above Judge Van Niekerk concluded that the employees’ 
employment status and the similarity of services were decisive in reaching its 
conclusion that there is a going concern. It is submitted that in second generation 
outsourcing the services performed by the incoming and outgoing contractor will 
always be similar. As such Judge Van Niekerk’s dependence on the role of 
employees is the one factor on which his decision is based. This is contrary to the 
UCT test where no one factor is decisive and thus reduces the objectivity of the test. 
In his concluding remarks Judge Van Niekerk stated:- 
It remained open to Phoenix and Tube City to employ none of Harsco’s employees, 
and to decline to take transfer of any or of Harsco’s assets. In this event, my 
conclusion would have been different, and there would I think have been no more 
than the termination of one contract and the beginning of another. But that is not 
what is to occur.231 
This comment cements the undue weight assigned to the transfer of employees. 
Judge Van Niekerk reasoned that had there not been a take over of employees, albeit 
with the transfer of assets which will be discussed below, there would not have been 
a transfer of a business as a going concern.  This line of reasoning creates a 
loophole.232 It denies employees the protection of s 197 when their fate is sealed 
based on the transferee’s silence or unwillingness to take over part of the transferor’s 
employees.233 Section 197 cannot be applicable only when the transferee elects to 
take over the employees. Deciding whether employees should be transferred cannot 
be based on asking if they have in fact been taken over or if there is an intention to 
take them over.234   
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This line of reasoning allows unscrupulous employers to be competitive in 
price by cutting labour costs when services are put out to tender.235 As the transaction 
is devised to avoid the conclusion that there is a going concern, the incoming 
contractor would not be obliged to take over any of the outgoing contractor’s 
employees. In the context of unskilled workers the new employer would suffer no 
prejudice in not taking over such employees as they are easy to replace.236 The 
outgoing contractor’s employees would be vulnerable to being made redundant by 
the outgoing contractor or in desperation for job security agree to less favour terms 
and conditions.237 This illustration clearly creates a situation which s 197 was 
intended to prevent.  
The reasoning of Judge Van Niekerk subverts the aim of s 197, as expressed by 
Judge Yacoob, at compelling the transfer of employees when they are not transferred 
with the business. Second generation outsourcing is arguably the type of scenario 
where Judge Yacoob’s comment regarding the relevance of whether the employees 
are transferred ‘may be limited and may depend on the circumstances of the case’ 
deserves the necessary attention.238 
Applying Judge Yacoob’s  cautionary observation, and in an attempt to avoid 
the setting of a precedent enabling employers to circumvent s 197, the facts of 
Harsco should arguably not have amounted to a transfer of a going concern. To 
amount to a s 197 transfer the facts would need to support, independently of the 
transferee taking over part or all of the employees, other contributory and compelling 
factors upon which to conclude that there is transfer of a business as going concern. 
It is arguable whether there existed other contributory factors of material influence 
which could have determined that there was a transfer of a going concern. 
While the above argument has focused on the role of employees, one cannot 
ignore the relevance of the assets introduced in Judge Van Niekerk’s comment that in 
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absence of a transfer of assets and take over of employees, there would not have been 
a transfer of a business as going concern.239 Judge Van Niekerk elevates the 
relevance of the transfer of assets, albeit via the client, in his comment under 
discussion. This contradicts the basis of his finding of a going concern in which the 
transfer of certain movable assets were regarded as ‘not entirely insignificant’ and 
which failed to play any determinative role in his conclusion that there was a transfer 
of a going concern.  Despite the inconsistency in his reasoning, Grogan argues that 
the Harsco permits the circumvention of s 197 through the simple avenue of a 
transferee not taking over the workforce and accepting none of the assets of the 
transferor.240 
Harsco reflects the uncertainty at the weight to be attached to the various 
factors – individually and in combination – proposed in UCT, and the implications 
on the reliance of the nature of the undertaking in the context of outsourcing.241 
Uncertainty breeds the danger that judges may subjectively assess the weight of the 
factors.242 At the same time the considerations relevant to the determination of a 
going concern need to remain flexible to accommodate the nuances that each 
transaction presents. Creating a rigid list with assigned relevance would allow 
employers to potentially identify avenues to circumvent the application of s 197. 243 
Evidently there exists a vicious cycle. An extensive debate into how to break such 
circular reasoning is not within the scope of this paper.  
The application of a going concern enquiry requires consideration as to avoid 
the anomaly Harsco has created.  Assigning weight to factors based on the nature of 
undertaking in determining whether there is a going concern within the outsourcing 
context has exposed a loophole.244 This is especially problematic in scenarios where 
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the businesses subject to transfer are asset reliant or labour intensive.245  At the very 
least Harsco confirms that when the transferee has expressed a desire or willingness 
to take over the majority of employees in the context of an outsourcing arrangement, 
and the employees are deemed to be a significant aspect of the business, the 
transferee will be compelled to take over the remainder of the employees.246  
The above discussion highlights unique considerations that apply due to the 
nature of second generation outsourcing in the determination of a going concern. 
This will be canvassed in the chapter to follow. 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Constitutional Court has pronounced that second generation outsourcing (and 
subsequent outsourcing) may depending on the facts of the case be subject to the 
application of s 197. Nevertheless the reasoning of the majority brings to the fore 
further issues that require clarification in order to prevent the SAA judgment, and the 
application of s 197 in the outsourcing context, from being manipulated to 
circumvent the implications of s 197. 
This chapter has identified and discussed three interpretational issues 
associated with SAA and its application in Harsco. First the uncertainty surrounding 
the role of the history of an outsourcing relationship. Secondly the potentially narrow 
application of the majority’s two stage transfer test. Thirdly the role of the take over 
of employees in the determination of a transfer of a going concern. Despite the above 
discussed issues, at the minimum SAA is conclusive authority that s 197 will apply if 
an original outsourcing agreement places an obligation on the outgoing contractor to 
transfer something back to the client or a third party.247 In addition, the occurrence of 
second generation outsourcing does not automatically imply nor does it 
automatically exclude the application of s 197.248 Without doubt the judgment has 
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hugely benefited the legal community in clarifying the potential application of s 197 














 CHAPTER 3:  THE ONGOING CONCERN OF A GOING 
CONCERN IN THE OUTSOURCING CONTEXT  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental proposition of this chapter is that the phrase ‘going concern’, within 
s 197(1) (b), as interpreted by UCT and applied in Harsco, is not suitable in the 
outsourcing context. Comparable ECJ case law and associated commentary are 
referenced to confirm reasoning problems associated with Harsco, and are used to 
project further potential pitfalls in the application of the going concern enquiry in the 
outsourcing context. The viability of possible solutions proposed by various 
commentators and there applicability in the South African context are examined.       
3.2. SECTION 197 (1)(B): THE MEANING OF ‘A GOING CONCERN’  
3.2.1. THE GOING CONCERN ENQUIRY 
In defining the phrase ‘going concern’ within s 197(1) (b), the Constitutional Court 
in UCT held that:- 
The phrase “going concern” is not defined in the LRA. It must therefore be given its 
ordinary meaning unless the context indicates otherwise. What is transferred must be 
a business in operation “so that the business remains the same but in different 
hands.” Whether that has occurred is a matter of fact which must be determined 
objectively in the light of the circumstances of each transaction. In deciding whether 
a business has been transferred as a going concern, regard must be had to the 
substance and not the form of the transaction. A number of factors will be relevant to 
the question whether a transfer of a business as a going concern has occurred, such 
as the transfer or otherwise of assets both tangible and intangible, whether or not 
workers are taken over by the new employer, whether customers are transferred and 
whether or not the same business is being carried on by the new employer. What 














decisive individually. They must all be considered in the overall assessment and 
therefore should not be considered in isolation.249 [own emphasis added]  
The aim of the going concern enquiry is to ascertain whether the pre-transfer 
identity and post transfer identity of the business under examination remains the 
same. This is assessed by applying suggested guiding factors, which do not amount 
to a closed list. The above quoted extract has repeatedly been referred to in 
subsequent case law as framing the test for whether there is a transfer as a going 
concern under s 197(1) (b).250 
3.2.2. A COMPARABLE ENQUIRY – THE ECJ’S EXPERIENCE 
Neither the EU Directive or TUPE or TUPE (2006) contain the phrase ‘going 
concern’. Nevertheless a comparable concept was introduced by the ECJ in the case 
of Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV etc Alfred Benedik en Zonen BV 
(hereinafter referred to as Spijkers).251 Spijkers interpreted Article 1(1) of the 1977 
version of the EU Directive with reference to the phase ‘transfer of an undertaking’. 
The facts presented amounted to a second generation outsourcing transaction. The 
court in Spijkers held that the decisive criterion in assessing whether there is a 
‘transfer of an undertaking’, within the scope of the EU Directive, is whether the 
business has retained its identity following the transfer.252 Such an examination 
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required assessing ‘…whether the business was disposed of as a going concern… ’253 
The court held that:- 
In order to determine whether those conditions are met, it is necessary to consider all 
the facts characterizing the transaction in question, including the type of undertaking 
or business, whether or not the business’s tangible assets, such as the buildings and 
movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of the 
transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new 
employer, whether or not its customers are transferred and the degree of similarity 
between the activities carried on before and after the transfer and the period, if any, 
for which those activities were suspended. It should be noted, however, that all those 
circumstances are merely single factors in the overall assessment which must be 
made and cannot be considered in isolation.254 
and,  
It is for the national court to make the necessary factual appraisals, in the light of the 
criteria for interpretation set out above, in order to establish whether or not there is a 
transfer in the sense indicated above.255 
Therefore for there to be a transfer of an undertaking under the EU Directive 
the business must have retained its identity pre and post transfer, which occurs when 
there is transfer of a going concern. This is comparable to the ‘transfer of a going 
concern’ [own emphasis added] requirement in s 197(1) (b).  
The assessment in Spijkers as to whether there is a going concern is 
comparable to the test proposed in UCT.256 In assessing whether the undertaking or 
business has retained its identity, both Spijkers and UCT propose the consideration of 
a non-exhaustive list of similar factors. 
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3.2.2.1. LIMITATIONS OF THE SPIJKERS JUDGMENT  
Beltzer addresses the limitations of Spijkers. Beltzer argues that Spijkers provides no 
insight into the weighting of its guiding factors, either individually or in 
combination.257  This causes concern that courts can interpret the factors 
subjectively, despite the objective fact-finding exercise Spijkers promotes.258  
Spijkers advocates that all the factors are of equal relevance in the enquiry.259 
The ECJ in the case of Christel Schmidt v Spar- und Leihkasse der früheren Ämter 
Bordesholm, Kiel und Cronshagen (hereinafter referred to as Schmidt),260 in applying 
Spijkers, determined that a lack of transferred assets when there existed other 
satisfied factors did not preclude the application of the EU Directive.261 This was 
seen as an attempt to clarify that all factors proposed by Spijkers are of equal 
relevance.262 In practice this is challenged.263 Beltzer argues that there is a tendency 
for the nature of the undertaking (the first of the listed factors in Spijkers)264 to 
invariably influence the role of the remaining factors.265 This paper proposes that 
such a conclusion is logical. The nature of the undertaking assists in identifying the 
defining components of the business being investigated.  These defining components, 
which inform the identity of the business, would unintentionally be assigned 
importance in ascertaining whether the identity of the business is retained pre- and 
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post- transfer. If the business under consideration is prominently labour driven, the 
labour element is a major component in maintaining the identity of the business. The 
take over, or lack thereof, of employees would play an influential role in establishing 
that the identity of the business, more so than for example whether or not assets have 
been taken over and if there is a similarity in services.266 The remaining factors 
would assume a secondary, supporting role.267 Failing the take over of employees, 
the defining element that informs the identity of the business is lacking. The same 
reasoning would apply if the business is asset-reliant.268  
However logical such reasoning may be, treating the nature of the undertaking 
as an umbrella factor allows transacting parties to circumvent the application of the 
EU Directive. Parties are able to structure the transaction to avoid the EU Directive 
by ensuring that the defining components of the business intended for transfer are not 
satisfied.269  As discussed in the previous chapter, the reasoning in Harsco as 
introduced these concerns into the South Africa context. 
3.3. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ‘GOING CONCERN’ ENQUIRY IN 
THE CONTEXT OF SECOND GENERATION OUTSOURCING  
3.3.1. CIRCULAR REASONING – THE IMPLICATIONS OF HARSCO  
As highlighted in chapter two, Harsco brings to the forefront a reasoning anomaly 
caused by attaching too much weight to the role of employees in the determination of 
whether there is a transfer of a going concern.  
In the absence of clear guidance as to the weight assigned to the various factors 
proposed by in UCT in respect of the going concern enquiry, Judge Van Niekerk 
regarded the nature of the business as the guiding consideration in his determination 
as to the relevance of each factor he identified on the facts.270 Judge Van Niekerk 
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regarded the employees as a significant component of the business operation.271 As 
was canvassed in chapter two, in regarding the take over of a majority of employees 
as one of the two determining factors in the establishment of a business as a going 
concern, Judge Van Niekerk created a reasoning conundrum.272 Allowing a 
transferee’s willingness to take over a majority of the outgoing contractor’s 
employees to determine the application of s 197 results in an employee’s right to 
transfer subject to the whim and control of the transferee.273 The taking over of 
employees cannot be a ‘criterion and a legal consequence’274 of s 197. This circular 
reasoning undermines the aim of s 197 to compel the transfer of employees when 
they are in fact not taken on and the protection afforded to employees by s 197.275 
3.3.2. ‘A GOING CONCERN’ IN THE OUTSOURCING CONTEXT  
In light of Beltzer’s arguments against Spijkers, and considering the impact of the 
reasoning in Harsco in undermining s 197, it is critical to examine the suitably of the 
going concern enquiry in the outsourcing context. 
For the purpose of this examination it is important to recap the guiding list of 
factors proposed by UCT in the determination as to whether there is a transfer as a 
going concern, namely:-  
a) The transfer or otherwise of assets both tangible and intangible; 
b) Whether or not the workers have been taken over by the new employer; 
c) Whether consumers are transferred, and  
                                                
271 Ibid para 33. 
272 Applying the argument by analogy see para 62 of the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak 
delivered on 26 October 2010, Clece SA, Case C - 463/09, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CC0463:EN:HTML, accessed on 7 
January 2013. 
273Ibid para 63. Also see John McMullen ‘TUPE Transfers: The Cracks Still Show’ (2001) 30 
Industrial Law Journal 396 at 397, and para 80 of the opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed 
delivered on 19 June 2003, Abler and Others, Case C-340/01 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001CC0340:EN:PDF, accessed on 7 
January 2013. 
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d) Whether or not the same business is being carried out by the new 
employer.276 
In the context of outsourcing, point c) would in all likelihood be answered in 
the affirmative due to its inherent nature in the outsourcing context277 (but for 
instances where the outgoing contractor may have a multitude of clients). Point d) is 
an intrinsic feature of an outsourcing transaction therefore would be answered in the 
affirmative. As observed by Beltzer, the Dutch Supreme Court disregarded this factor 
due to its inherent nature in changes of service providers in the outsourcing service 
sector.278 Other potential factors such as carrying on the business in the same 
location and premises would also inevitably be satisfied.279 Therefore points a) and 
b) are the only variable factors left of the going concern test in the outsourcing 
context.280 Arguably the business will not be able to retain its identity pre- and post- 
transfer without its major identifying features. The major identifying features, as 
previously argued, of the business are informed, albeit it problematic, by the nature 
of the business concerned. Therefore in a labour intensive business the existence of 
the take over of a sufficient portion of the employees will ensure that pre- and post- 
transfer the business retains its identity. This would lead to a transfer of a business as 
going concern. If no employees are taken over, a labour intensive business will 
arguably not retain the essence of its identity. Consequently in a labour intensive 
outsourcing sector significant weight would by implication be assigned to the take 
over of the employees. As argued this would undermine s 197 due to the resultant 
circular reasoning.281 This same argument would apply to asset-reliant businesses.   
This theoretical position is what played out in Harsco. The court regarded the 
workforce as an important component of the business operations being transferred.282 
Ultimately while other factors such as the transfer of assets and the similarity of the 
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services were acknowledged, they played an ancillary role to the take over of a 
majority of the employees.  
The above analysis highlights that the going concern enquiry is not suitable 
within the outsourcing context. The potential over-reliance on the take over of 
employees and transfer of assets will lead to the perpetuation of the circular 
reasoning in Harsco, and the danger that employers will take advantage of the 
loophole that such reasoning exposes by structuring their transactions to circumvent 
the application of s 197. 
3.4.  THE MOTIVE CRITERION AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION   
3.4.1. THE MOTIVE CRITERION 
In an attempt to prevent employers deliberately abusing the going concern enquiry in 
the outsourcing context, Bosch suggests that the courts should have regard to the 
motives of the transaction parties.283 Should the court find that the potential new 
employer deliberately structured the transaction as to avoid the application of s 197, 
it would be permitted to examine the facts as though the deception had not 
occurred.284 In essence, the court would be entitled to conclude that there is a transfer 
of business as a going concern despite the existence of actual factors.285 Therefore an 
incoming contractor who intentionally does not take over the workforce of the 
outgoing contractor in order to avoid the implications of s 197 will nonetheless be 
assumed to having taken over the workforce for the purposes of s 197.   
3.4.2. THE MOTIVE CRITERION UNDER TUPE 
Bosch relied on the English decision of ADI (UK) Ltd v Willer 286 (hereinafter 
referred to as ADI) in support of his proposal of the motive criterion.287 ADI 
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Firm Security. Firm Security failed to offer employment to ADI’s employees. The resultant litigation 















approved the motive criterion 288 first introduced by the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal in the case of ECM (Vehicle Delivery Service Ltd) v Cox (hereinafter 
referred to as ECM).289  The EAT in ECM held that a transferee who intentionally 
avoids the application of TUPE cannot rely on the fact that the employees are not 
taken over as a factor determining that there is no transfer as contemplated by 
TUPE.290  ECM was confirmed in the Court of Appeal291 which approved, inter alia, 
that the intention of a transferee to avoid the application of TUPE is one of the 
relevant factors in the determination as to whether there was a TUPE transfer.292 
Both the judgments of ECM and ADI expressly advance a purposive approach to the 
application of TUPE in advocating the motive criterion.293  
3.4.3. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE MOTIVE CRITERION   
Bosch neglects to canvass the practical application of the motive criterion. European   
commentators, critiquing the motive criterion, highlight the issues of proof 
                                                                                                                                     
is referred to in op cit 95 at 183. For commentary on the case law informing the motive criterion see 
John McMullen ‘TUPE - Sidestepping Süzen’ (1999) 28 Industrial Law Journal 360. 
287 Notably the minority in ADI supra note 286 paras 78-79, 81-83 rejected the application of the 
motive criterion as the judge failed to, inter alia, reconcile permitting a transfer when on the facts no 
transfer had occurred.  
288 ADI supra note 286 para 35-37, 40 and 59 where the court, inter alia, held that that there would be 
a transfer of an undertaking on the facts of the case if it was shown that the transferee, namely Firm 
Security, had intentionally avoided the application of TUPE by not taking over the workforce. The 
matter was referred back to the employment tribunal to consider the intention of the transferee. 
289 (1998) IRLR 416 (EAT) at paras 19, 24-26. The case dealt with the interpretation of TUPE reg 
3(1). On the facts of the case Axial had an outsourcing contract with a client, namely VAG Ltd. Axial 
provided drivers which delivered vehicles from two docks. The provision of the services from each 
dock was governed by two separate agreements. Axial lost one of the contracts. ECM was appointed 
in its place. The employees of Axial in respect of the terminated contract were not transferred to 
ECM. In the proceedings before the employment tribunal ECM had intentionally not taken over the 
employees of Axial in order to avoid the application of the TUPE and the threats by the employees on 
the basis of the TUPE. See ECM para 24. 
290 Ibid paras 24-25. Also see the discussion of ECM in ADI supra note 286 paras 12-13.  
291 ECM (Vehicle Delivery Service Ltd) v Cox (1999) IRLR 559 (CA). 
292 Ibid para 23 where the Court of Appeal held that:-  
The tribunal was entitled to have regard, as a relevant circumstance, to the reason why those 
employees were not appointed by ECM. The Court of Justice has not decided in Süzen or any 
other case that this is an irrelevant circumstance or that the failure of the transferee to appoint 
any of the former employees of the transferor points conclusively against a transfer. 
Also see commentary by John McMullen (1999) op cit note 286 at 363. 
293 ADI supra note 286 paras 53-54 and 58 and supra note 289 para 25. Notably the minority in ADI 














associated with its application.294 What will be regarded as sufficient proof of the 
new employer’s intentional motive?295 Unscrupulous employers would surely ensure 
their true intentions are well hidden knowing their intentions can be subjected to the 
courts scrutiny. This would leave the motive factor with limited application in cases 
where trade union or employee representatives have been privy to slip-ups made by 
the employers in the transaction. The evidentiary difficulty in establishing motive is 
heighted in assessing the motive prior to the intended transfer.296 
Assuming the transferee deliberately avoids s 197, the court would be 
speculating, in the absence of fact, as to the portion of employees that would have 
been taken over had the deception not occurred.297  Therefore what hypothetical 
portion of employees will be deemed sufficient? Will it suffice that a majority of 
employees in number would have transferred but for the deception, as was persuasive 
in Harsco, or will it be sufficient that key employees would have been transferred? 
Furthermore, what will happen when some employees are taken over, albeit not 
significant, and others are not?  
Lord Justice May in ADI determined that ‘if the reason or principle reason’ for 
the transferee not taking over the employees is to circumvent the application of 
TUPE, there would be a TUPE transfers on the facts.298 The motive criterion 
seemingly allows a court to examine the business reasons behind the structure of the 
transaction. Courts would have to be cautious in not concluding that legitimate 
business decisions, which move the transaction outside the scope of s 197, are not 
regarded as being a deliberate circumvention of s 197.  Arguably there would be a 
fine line in assessing whether a deliberate circumvention was been disguised as a 
legitimate business decision. 
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295 Op cit note 234 at 370; op cit note 235 at 381; John McMullen (2001) op cit note 273 at 400 and 
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The above practical considerations flag that the motive criterion should be 
approached with caution in determining whether it is a viable solution to the issues 
associated with the application of the going concern enquiry in the outsourcing 
context. 
3.5. MIRRORS IN REASONING: SÜZEN AND HARSCO 
The motive criterion in ECM was in response to the argued narrowing application of 
the Spijkers factors introduced by the ECJ case of Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker 
Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice. 299 (hereinafter referred to as Süzen) 
The facts of Süzen concerned a change of service provider, in the second generation 
outsourcing context, in the cleaning sector.300 No ‘tangible or intangible business 
assets were transferred’301 and the employees of the outgoing contractor were 
dismissed prior to the change of service provider.302 Applying Spijkers, Süzen stated, 
and as cited by Bosch,303 that:-  
…[I]n assessing the facts characterizing the transaction in question, [the National 
Court] must take into account among other things the type of undertaking or 
business concerned. It follows that the degree of importance to be attached to each 
criterion for determining whether or not there has been a transfer within the meaning 
of the directive will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on, or indeed 
the production or operating methods employed in the relevant undertaking, business 
or part of a business. Where in particular an economic entity is able, in certain 
sectors, to function without any significant tangible or intangible assets, the 
maintenance of its identity following the transaction affecting it cannot, logically, 
depend on the transfer of such assets.304 
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In its findings Süzen specifically excluded from the scope of the EU Directive 
the possibility that a change of service provider can invoke the application of the EU 
Directive.305  It held that there existed no transfer under the EU Directive, in the 
context of a second generation transaction, 
…if there is no concomitant transfer from one undertaking to the other of significant 
tangible or intangible assets or taking over by the new employer of a major part of 
the workforce, in terms of their numbers and skills, assigned by his predecessor to 
the performance of the contract.306 
The relationship between the transfer of assets and employees in the above 
quoted extract was regarded as ambiguous.307 The court’s wording appeared 
indifferent to the presence of either.308 The impact of the subsequent judgment of Oy 
Liikenne v Pekka Liskjarvi and Pentii Juneunen309  in applying Süzen clarified the 
relationship between the two criteria of assets and employees in the outsourcing 
context.310 The transfer of assets was of relevance when the business subject to the 
enquiry required significant assets in combination with the employees.311 In a labour 
intensive business the take over of a major part of the transferor’s employees, in their 
number and skills, would be determinative of a transfer.312  
It is argued that Harsco is the South African equivalent of Süzen. Harsco, 
albeit its confusing concluding remarks, places weight on the factors of assets and 
employees in the outsourcing context in the determination of a going concern.313 This 
is comparable to that in Süzen. The implications that stem from Süzen are 
comparable to that of Harsco. Both judgments through their circular reasoning 
highlight the loophole that permits transferees in the outsourcing context to avoid the 
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application of the Directive and s 197 respectively. By implication the arguments 
levied against Süzen are applicable to Harsco.  
3.6. LESSONS FROM SÜZEN  
As argued previously the findings of Süzen are comparable to the findings of Harsco 
insofar as priority is attached to the transfer of the majority of employees and the 
transfer of assets. With Süzen decided in 1999, the below section seeks to draw on 
experiences from the United Kingdom and ECJ in assessing the potential future 
difficulties that awaits our courts.  
3.6.1. THE SCOPE OF THE APPLICATION OF SÜZEN 
The Süzen judgment has been interpreted to extend beyond the second generation 
context, in which it was decided, to all outsourcing arrangements.314 In light of 
Süzen, Shrubsall argues that irrespective of the generation of an outsourcing 
transaction, a transfer of a service will only become a business capable of being 
transferred if in a labour intensive sector there is the take over of the majority of the 
workers and in an asset-reliant entity there is a take over of significant assets. This is 
nothing in the wording, Shrubsall argues, to conclude that the Süzen principle is 
limited to second generation outsourcing.315 
There is nothing to prevent such a finding within the South African context. 
The implications of the circular reasoning present in Harsco and the possible 
circumvention of s 197 may have a broader impact than to the confines of the facts of 
the case to second generation outsourcing.  This widening scope allows the client and 
the first contractor in an initial outsourcing contract to collude to ensure that the 
client is able to dispose of its unwanted employees, subject to retrenchment 
payments. The initial contractor is able to tender at a competitive price through 
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recruiting new staff at lesser terms of employment, insofar as they structure their 
transaction ‘correctly’ to not invoke the application of s 197. 316   
3.6.2. ‘…A MAJOR PART OF THE WORKFORCE, IN TERMS OF THEIR 
NUMBERS AND SKILLS, ASSIGNED BY HIS PREDECESSOR TO THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT…’317 
The phrase ‘…a major part of the workforce, in terms of their numbers and skills, 
assigned by his predecessor to the performance of the contract…’318 generates 
practical concerns.319 
3.6.2.1. CHERRY PICKING 
Shrubsall argues that the reference to ‘…a major part…’ allows a transferee to pick 
and choose certain staff in so long as they are not deemed to constitute a ‘major’ part 
of the outgoing contractor’s workforce.320 Such a narrowed down workforce will not 
be subject to the protection of the EU Directive. The consequence being that a 
transferee would often prefer skilled employees that it can cherry pick, leaving easily 
replaceable unskilled workers jobless. This defeats the purpose of the EU Directive 
in protecting job security, especially as it applies to vulnerable unskilled workers.321 
  The reasoning in Harsco relied on the fact that the majority of the workforce 
transferred.322 The ‘majority’ refers to the majority in number of employees, which is 
supported in the judgment’s dismissal of AMSA’s contention to adopt a qualitative 
approach in that key managers had been left behind. AMSA argued that leaving 
behind key managers overrode the fact that 70 per cent of the workforce was taken 
over by the two incoming contractors.323 The court in dismissing such an argument 
held that the ‘operation of the physical infrastructure by skilled and semi-skilled 
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employees’ was ‘a significant component of the business operation …’324  Applying 
the argument of Shrubsall detailed above, the reasoning in Harsco would allow 
employers to cherry pick employees, arguably skilled employees, insofar as the 
selection falls below the majority of employees in number. This leaves unskilled 
workers unprotected by s 197. 
3.6.2.2. ‘…IN TERMS OF THEIR NUMBERS AND SKILLS…’ 
Süzen required that for there to be a transfer based on the workforce, it must be major 
in terms of headcount and in skill. Advocate General Trstenjak interpreted the 
relationship between the two components as such:325 the ‘number’ of employees 
taken over plays a role of its own by the word ‘and’, yet is paired with ‘skills’, 
therefore they are linked.326 For a new employer to benefit from staff, their quality is 
relevant, hence the reference to skill.327 Evidently more is required than the take over 
of a majority of the workforce in number. The practical application of the two 
components questions whether a transaction will be subject to the EU Directive if all 
the skilled workers are transferred but they fail to constitute a majority in terms of 
total number of employees that are associated with the transferring entity.328 The 
implications of Süzen may also involve the court undertaking ‘some sort of skills 
evaluation exercise.’329 
As discussed the Harsco judgment requires a majority of employees in terms 
of number. No reference is made to skill. If the element of skill is introduced for 
whatever reason, its relationship with that of the majority in number needs to be 
clarified to prevent unskilled workers being denied the protection of s 197. This issue 
is linked to the cherry picking concern as discussed previously.  
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3.6.3. ‘… OF SIGNIFICANT TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE ASSETS…’ 
Süzen requires the transfer of significant tangible or intangible assets.330 The Harsco 
judgment is vague as to the role of the assets. The judgment up until the concluding 
remarks331 did not assign any apparent weight to the transfer of the assets in reaching 
its decision. It made passing remarks such as ‘not in itself an overriding factor’332 
and ‘not entirely insignificant’333 in respect of the lack of the transfer of plants and 
the transfer of other assets respectively.   
This issue draws on Bosch’s argument, canvassed in chapter two, in respect of 
a deficiency within SAA. Bosch’s concern raises the question ‘when will a transferor 
have done enough that it can be said that the transfer was by such person?’334 As 
such it is sufficient that some form of assets are transferred or that the main assets are 
transferred.335  Harsco does not clarify this issue. It could at a stretch be argued that 
based on its concluding remarks, in combination with its previous statements as to 
the role of the assets, it did not require the transferred assets to be significant. This 
paper however argues that the same concluding remarks considered in light of its 
earlier dismissal of the determinative role of the asset muddies the role of the assets. 
As such no inference can be drawn from the court’s reasoning. The above remains to 
be clarified. 
3.7. SOLVING THE CIRCULAR REASONING  
3.7.1. THE MOTIVE CRITERION 
The motive criterion has not met with success within the European legal 
community.336 Its application has not been applied consistency in case law. Some 
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judgments have applied Süzen qualified by the motive factor while others applying 
Süzen unqualified by the motive factor.337 
3.7.2. A MINIMUM NUMBER OF FACTORS 
Bletzer suggests that the courts could require that a minimum number of factors be 
present before a transfer is a going concern.338  It is argued that this solution is 
artificial. First, as previously argued the factors proposed in UCT will in most 
instances in the outsourcing context be satisfied. Therefore there would arguably also 
be more than one factor that is achieved. Secondly, upon which basis would the 
courts determine a minimum number without it being arbitrary and accommodating 
the nature of any type of transaction? 
3.7.3. AMENDMENT TO LEGISLATION 
It was argued that Süzen created an ‘inefficiency’ in the operation of the law. 339 The 
British Government’s solution to the uncertainty and loopholes in the application of 
the EU Directive, and accordingly the application of TUPE, was the introduction of 
TUPE (2006).340 The changes brought about by TUPE (2006) were canvassed in 
chapter one. TUPE (2006) regards a change in service provider as automatically 
amounting to a transfer.341 It is submitted that this solution is not viable in light of 
SAA. The type of amendment envisaged by TUPE (2006) would involve a departure 
from a factual analysis of the facts as to whether there is a transfer of a business as a 
going concern.342 A critical analysis of the relevant provisions of TUPE (2006) and 
its suitability within South Africa is not within the scope of this paper. As mentioned 
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in chapter one, the application of TUPE (2006) has not been without its own 
problems.343 
3.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above analysis serves to highlights the issues, both present and future, that may 
arise through the application of going concern enquiry, in the context of outsourcing, 
as showcased in Harsco and comparative foreign case law. Despite highlighting 
further interpretational concerns, a comparative investigation does not provide any 
viable solutions to the issues that may present itself in the South African outsourcing 
sector if the Harsco reasoning is too readily adopted. 
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 CHAPTER 4: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
APPLICATION OF S 197 IN THE OUTSOURCING CONTEXT  
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The Constitutional Court in SAA is commendable for its advancement of the 
protection of job security. Nonetheless it is respectfully submitted that it overlooked 
an opportunity to identify and evaluate the practical difficulties and economic 
implications of its decision in the outsourcing context. This could have affected its 
judgment and, as will be argued, at very least initiated the possible amendment of s 
197.  
 Prior to the judgment various commentators have acknowledged the practical 
difficulties which may arise should s 197 apply to outsourcing transactions.344 
Consequently the theoretical impact of such a decision is not an unrealistic 
expectation, especially considering the Constitutional Court functions as a court of 
final instance, 345 and is consequently the architect of ‘policy and principle’.346  This 
is not to suggest that outsourcing sh uld be excluded from the scope of s 197 due to 
the existence of practical difficulties. However had the Constitutional Court 
considered the practical implications, and consequently the commercial impact of its 
decision, it would have observed that the present formulation of s 197 fails to 
account for the nuanced economic context and relationship dynamics associated with 
an outsourcing arrangement.   
Applied without regard to considerations unique to the outsourcing context, s 
197 disproportionately pursues the social rights of employees at the expense of the 
business interest of employers. 347  It is argued that the provisions of s 197 are 
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unsuitable for application in the outsourcing sector.348 The broader impact of the 
current situation is the possible negative effect it may have on the economic growth 
of the South African outsourcing sector.  
 This chapter addresses the practical implications of the application of s 197 in 
the outsourcing sector by considering the tendering process associated with an 
outsourcing transaction, the structure of the contractual relationships, and the 
dynamics between the parties directly and indirectly impacted by s 197 against the 
current provisions that comprise s 197.  
4.2.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.2.1. EMPLOYEE INFORMATION AND COMPETITIVE TENDERING 
Section 197 has the effect that the liabilities of the employees of the old employer are 
transferred over to the new employer.349 The new employer in turn can potentially 
reduce such employee liabilities by, inter alia, negotiating with the old employer that 
it indemnifies the new employer against such liabilities.350 Alternatively the new 
employer can factor the potential employees’ liabilities into the purchase price of a 
business with the insight gained from a due diligence process. If s 197 can potentially 
apply to a second generation outsourcing transaction, the problem presents itself that 
while the incoming contractor knows it will assume responsibility of employees and 
the associated liabilities, the determination of the extent of that liability remains 
problematic.351 It is argued that permitting second generation outsourcing, and future 
generation outsourcing, to potentially fall within the present formulation of s 197 
affects the competitive tendering process associated with the outsourcing sector. 
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Potential contractors will find it difficult to ‘plan and budget’ for the potential 
contracting opportunity.352   
To contextualise the issue: In the case of sale or merger of a business which 
triggers s 197, the prudent purchaser would go through an acquisition checklist. A 
critical part of the process would be performing a due diligence on the business.353 
This would include a due diligence on the employees and associated obligations.354 
The financial implications of which would influence the purchase price of the 
business. Therefore the take over of employees is a normal and calculated 
commercial risk associated with the transaction.355  
In delineating and assigning a financial value to the obligations it would be 
assuming, and in assessing whether it can comply with the terms and conditions of 
employment of the seller,356 the purchaser would request employee information such 
as:-  
• specifics of the employees to be transferred;  
• employees length of employment and cost to company;  
• the accrued benefits owing to each employee at time of intended 
transfer  (for example leave or bonuses earned but not paid out);  
• details as to the retirement fund, medical aid scheme of the employees 
or made available to the employees;  
• specifics of any non-standard employment terms; 
• a list and details of any present or potential disputes between the 
present employer and an employee; and 
                                                
352 Op cit note 4 at 10. 
353 Carole A Spink and Ute Krudewagen ‘From Acquired Rights to Reverse TUPE: Employment Law 
Issues in Global Outsourcing Transactions’ (2009) 9 Chicago-Kent Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 46 at 92. 
354 Susan Stelzner, Stuart Harrison Brian Patterson and Zahida Ebrahim ‘South Africa: Legal 
Compliance in South Africa’ in Salvador del Rey and Robert J Mignin (eds) International Labour and 
Employment Compliance Handbook (2010) at 26. 
355 Op cit note 347 para 39. 














• ‘confirmation of compliance with all relevant labour legislation and that 
any required levies are up to date (for example Unemployment 
Insurance, Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases, 
Employment Equity Reports)’.357 
The importance of conducting a due diligence is of no less value in the 
outsourcing context.358 On the termination of an outsourcing contract, irrespective of 
its generation, the client would generally invite third parties to submit tenders in 
response to its request for proposals in respect of the service.359 This is referred as a 
competitive tendering process.360 It is argued that the ability of a tenderer or an 
incoming contractor to conduct a due diligence, and in so doing receive the necessary 
employee information, is constrained due to the dynamics f the relationships that 
exists between the parties involved in an outsourcing transaction.361  
It is the position of this paper that the due diligence process should occur when 
a third party is deliberating whether to tender.362 Admittedly, such position is not 
without implications.  Commentators argue that an outgoing contractor would be 
hesitant to release confidential information,363 and/or obstructive if the outgoing 
contractor is tendering for the contract or is disgruntled, to provide employee 
information to its competitors who may or may not be successful in the tender.364 
There is evidently no incentive to release such information. In addition the possibility 
of the outgoing contractor indemnifying the incoming contractor against any 
employee associated liability would be very slim.365 Without conducting a due 
diligence and the extraction of the required information, competitive tenders cannot 
be submitted to the client. The potential incoming contractor will not be able to 
                                                
357 Op cit note 354 at 26. 
358 Op cit note 353 at 92. 
359 Ibid at 91. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Arguing by analogy from Malcolm Sargeant ‘New Transfer Regulations’ (2002) 31 Industrial Law 
Survey 35 at 44. Also see op cit note 351 at 20. 
362 Op cit note 353 at 92. 
363 Malcolm Sargeant op cit note 361 at 44. 
364 Op cit note 53 at 116; op cit note 65 at 90 and op cit note 95 at 186. 














precisely determine whether the contracting opportunity is financially viable and the 
costing accuracy of its submitted tender.366  This could possibly reduce the number 
of tenders submitted.367  It is argued that the labour force component, especially in 
labour intensive services, is the major component of the contract price and thus a 
determinative factor in the commercial viability of a contracting opportunity.368 
These considerations undermine the competitiveness of the tendering process in the 
outsourcing context. 
Bosch argues that regulation 11 of TUPE (2006) provides a possible solution in 
respect of compelling disclosure of employee information.369 Regulation 11 of TUPE 
(2006) compels the transferor to, inter alia, provide the transferee with what is 
collectively referred to as ‘employee liability information.’370 The transferor must 
comply ‘…not less than fourteen days before the relevant transfer… .’371 Regulation 
11 is of limited assistance. It admittedly creates an obligation to disclose clearly 
defined and required information. Despite same the time period introduced by TUPE 
(2006) is of limited value. The statutory time frame imposed is of no assistance to a 
potential contractor who requires information in order to assess the commercial 
viability of the contracting opportunity. TUPE (2006) seemingly requires that the 
transferee has been selected.  
It is argued that to ensure a viable and competitive tender the employee 
information should be disclosed before the submission of the tenders. Support of 
such timing does however exacerbate the potential problem that the outgoing 
contractor will be unwillingly to supply the necessary information. The point in time 
in which the employee information is theoretically required sparks the potential 
                                                
366 Malcolm Sargeant op cit note 361 at 44. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Op cit note 347 at para 35. Also see Amie Jasmine Ahanchian op cit note 24 at 57 where the author 
discusses the impact of labour costs in the service-related sector. 
369 Op cit note 95 at 187. 
370 Regulation 11(2) details such ‘employee liability information’ as meaning, inter alia, the identity 
and age of the employee, the particulars of employment of each employee, details as to disciplinary 
procedures against the employee or grievance procedures taken by the employee; details as to any 
court or tribunal case. 














confidentiality concerns of the outgoing contractor.372 If the incoming contractor is 
selected, the disclosure of the necessary information and performance of a due 
diligence would arguably be less of an issue to the outgoing contractor.  
Bosch further argues that the client, through a contractual obligation in the 
outsourcing agreement, could compel the outgoing contractor to disclose the required 
employee information and allow a due diligence in the event of a s 197 transfer.373 It 
is argued that this solution, while it has value in theory, may have limited practical 
value. First, Bosch’s argument assumes that the client in such an instance has 
sufficient negotiating power over the contractor to include such a contractual term. 
Secondly, there exists no incentive for the outgoing contractor to agree and adhere to 
such a contractual obligation considering it would have already lost the contract, and 
if the contract was terminated due to its breach, it would be unlikely that it would be 
tendering or be a successful tenderer.  
Bosch further proposes that ‘trade unions and relevant employees’ could be 
sources of the necessary employee information.374 This proposal, commendable for 
the attempt to seek solutions to the problem, has limited practical value. Bosch’s 
proposal involves a potentially burdensome administrative process and a piece-meal 
extraction of the information. The accuracy and completeness of certain aspects of 
the type of information required would be hard to verify by such parties, for example 
details as to the compliance with labour legislation and present or potential 
disputes.375 The ingoing contractor may be surprised by obligations it did not factor 
in or factored in incorrectly.   
In the event that employee information is not furnished within a reasonable 
time prior to the submission of tenders, or the transfer date, should tenderers or 
contractors not have the right to modify their pricing structures after submission of 
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373 Op cit note 95 at 187. 
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the tenders or after its appointment? 376  Permitting such an adjustment prior to the 
closing of tenders would allow vindictive outgoing contractors to frustrate the 
tendering process. Allowing the price to be adjusted post selection could prejudice 
the client who may have appointed such contractor on the basis of the pricing 
structure.377 The selected incoming contractor could abuse such an opportunity to 
inflate its profits. Prohibiting the adjustment outright would in turn prejudice the 
tenderer or incoming contractor who in good faith determined its pricing on the 
available information. This is a debate which s 197 does not even remotely entertain.  
Assuming that employee information is delivered, s 197 further omits to place an 
onus on the old employer to notify the new employer of any subsequent changes to 
information it may have already submitted.378   
Regulation 12 of TUPE (2006) gives teeth to regulation 11of TUPE (2006). It 
provides that a transferee, within a certain time period, may apply to the employment 
tribunal to force the transferee to comply with the provisions regulating the timeous 
and complete submission of employment liability information.379 In the event the 
tribunal regards the claim as having merit, it can order the transferor to pay the 
transferee ‘just and equitable’ compensation.380 In determining the amount of 
compensation the tribunal must have regard to:- 
[A]ny loss sustained by the transferee which is attributable to the matters 
complained of; and 
the terms of any contract between the transferor and the transferee relating to the 
transfer under which the transferor may be liable to pay any sum to the transferee in 
                                                
376 Malcolm Sargeant op cit note 361 at 44. 
377 Accordingly to the Outsourcing Institute in a 1998 survey, it determined that the objective to 
‘reduce and control operating costs’ was the top reasoning why companies outsource. Whether it has 
this intended benefit in practice is debatable. See, The Outsourcing Institute ‘Top Ten Outsourcing 
Survey 1998’, available at 
http://www.outsourcing.com/content.asp?page=01b/articles/intelligence/oi_top_ten_survey.htm, 
accessed on 4 January 2013. Also see commentary in op cit note 353 at 47-48. 
378 John McMullen (2006) op cit note 38 at 136. 
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respect of a failure to notify the transferee of employee liability information. [own 
emphasis added]381 
The compensation awarded can be no less than £500 per employee.382 Despite 
same the tribunal can issue a lower amount if it is ‘just and equitable.’383 This 
arguably undermines the very point of having a minimum fine. Regulation 12 further 
requires the transferee to mitigate its loss.384  
Can a comparable provision apply in the context of s 197 in the outsourcing 
context? First, TUPE (2006) introduces punitive measures after the appointment of 
the contractor. Addressing the lack of information post event is problematic. As 
argued previously, tenderers require the employee liability information to determine 
whether it will pursue the opportunity.  Absent a mechanism to compel disclosure in 
the tendering process, the competitiveness of the tendering process will be 
undermined.  Secondly, in making an award of compensation that is just and 
equitable, TUPE (2006) assumes the existence of a contract between the incoming 
contractor and the outgoing contractor.385 As has been discussed this is seldom the 
case in an outsourcing transaction where the contractual obligation would inevitably 
exists between the client and incoming service provider.386 Thirdly, imposing a 
predetermined statutory fine would clearly not accommodate the financial 
implications that may arise in every situation. The fine would arguably have to be 
proportionate to the prejudice that the incoming contractor would suffer, and more 
than just an inconsequential financial hiccup to the previous contractor. Imposing 
liability assumes the capability of the transferor to pay. Finally, seeking 
compensation means litigation. Litigation means expense and time. This is an 
inconvenience for a new employer.  
                                                
381 Regulation 12(4). 
382 Regulation 12(5). 
383 Regulation 12(5). 
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386 It is notable that our courts do not require there to be a contractual link between the transferor and 














The above discussion addresses the uncertainties that underlie the securement 
of employment information and the conducting of a due diligence in the outsourcing 
sector when s 197 applies. These considerations are likely to discourage suitable 
contractors from tendering.  
4.2.2. SECTION 197(6) OF THE LRA 
Section 197(6) permits the conclusion of an agreement to vary the consequences of s 
197. This agreement can be concluded between both the old employer and the new 
employer with the employees’ representative, or between either the old employer or 
the new employer and the employees’ representative. This agreement introduces the 
element of flexibility to alleviate the financial onus placed on the new employer.387  
Bosch argues that the incoming contractor may have difficulty in concluding 
an agreement envisaged in s 197(6).388 He argues that before the transfer the 
tendering contractor will not have access to the employees’ representative, and 
following its appointment, after the transfer it would have lost its negotiating power 
with the employees’ representatives.389 Bosch, in a separate article, seemingly 
counters this argument by focusing on s 197(6) permitting a new employer, without 
the involvement of an old employer, to conclude an agreement with the employees’ 
representative to vary the terms and conditions after the transfer but before the 
service commences.390 This does not however change the position that absent an 
agreement the new employer has to meet the terms and conditions of employment no 
less favourable than that of the old employer. It seems unlikely that the trade union 
would want to negotiate any lesser terms post transfer.   
4.2.3.  THE IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
The growth of small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) are at risk due to the 
potential application of s 197 in the outsourcing context.  There are various reasons 
                                                
387 Op cit note 65 at 91. 
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why SMMEs play an important role in the economy.391 For the purposes of this paper 
their role in creating job opportunities for the unskilled labour force, their function as 
a platform for innovation and entrepreneurism, and their resilience to economic 
depression is of relevance.392  It has been determined that South Africa’s SMMEs 
would be stimulated through ‘links with the large corporate sector and 
government’393 with subcontracting regarded as an essential link.394 This would in 
turn promote job creation.395  
It is argued that underpinning s 197 is the assumption that the incoming 
contractor has the same capabilities and resources as the outgoing contractor.396 This 
blanket assumption is incorrect.397 Section 197 potentially raises the costs of 
employment for SMMEs.398  SMMEs with limited start-up capital arguably have 
limited financial resources.399 In the outsourcing context, the potential viable 
contracting opportunities for SMMEs may be limited by s 197. It is probable that 
SMMEs would not be able to meet the financial obligations imposed by labour costs 
                                                
391 John Luiz ‘Small Business Development, Entrepreneurship And Expanding The Business Sector In 
A Developing Economy: The Case Of South Africa’ (2011) 18 (2) Journal of Applied Business 
Research 53 at 54-56. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Ibid at 66. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Trent D Sebbens op cit note 1 at 166 and 170. 
397  Arguing by analogy from  PP Consultants Pty Ltd v Finance Sector Union [2000] HCA 59; 201 
CLR 648; 75 ALJR 191; 101 IR 103; 176 ALR 205 para 40, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/59.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=FCA%201999%201251
%20or%201999%20FCA%201251, accessed on 7 January 2013, where the minority judgment held 
that:- 
Whilst it may be accepted that a purpose of the provision is to prevent evasion of obligations 
by employers who do succeed to a business or part thereof, there is another policy 
consideration which bears on this case. The legislation, it may be inferred requires a common 
identity of a business or part thereof, into whosever hands it falls, on the assumption that a 
successor will have the same and continuing capacity to meet the obligations arising under an 
award as the former operator of the business. No such assumption may safely be made about 
a different business.  
This decision was determined in the context of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).  Notably the 
promulgation of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) has overruled this decision. See commentary in Trent 
D Sebbens op cit note 1 at 164-166; Sutherland and Riley op cit note 1 at 284 and Manoj Dias-Abey 
op cit note 1 at 170-172. 
398 See op cit note 391 at 65 which broadly address the obstacles and challenge that impede the growth 
of SMMEs. Also see Amie Jasmine Ahanchian op cit note 24 at 45. 














of a more established, larger contractor capable of offering terms more favourable 
than the SMME’s can afford.400 While they might be able to submit competitive 
tenders in the sense that they have lower labour costs, they might not be able to 
compete in terms of complying with offering terms not less favourable than those 
offered by the old employer when the contracting opportunity is potentially triggered 
by s 197.  The broader impact of such line of reasoning is that the growth of SMMEs 
are stifled, this affects the economic growth of South Africa which is of importance 
in the present economic recession,401 and the role of SMMEs as a source of job  
creation, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
4.2.4. A MANIPULATION OF THE MARKET 
In the context of outsourcing it is possible for a contractor to manipulate the 
competitiveness of the market in which it operates. Bosch argues that a contractor 
who offers its employees excessively favourable terms and conditions will place a 
potentially insurmountable financial burden on its competitors in the event of a 
change in service provider amounting to a s 197 transfer.402 In the event that a new 
contractor is awarded the tender, the labour costs imposed via s 197 can potentially 
affect the sustainability of its business.403  
It can be argued that the new employer can counter the outgoing contractor’s 
attempt to manipulate the market, and tender despite the onerous labour costs, by 
utilising s 197(6). Section 197 (6) permits, inter alia, the new employer to enter into 
negotiations with trade unions404 to, inter alia, vary the onerous terms and conditions 
of the employment.405 Nevertheless one must be mindful that the s 197(6) does not 
compel negotiation and is premised on variation by consensus.406 In the absence of 
                                                
400 Op cit note 391 at 66 insofar as the article refers to the lack of financial backing of tenderers. 
401 Op cit note 353 at 47. 
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403 Kristen Carson ‘TUPE or Not too TUPE?: The Impact of Labor Regulations on Business 
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Undergraduate Research Journal 37 at 41. 
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the trade union being compelled and a consensual agreement, the consequences of s 
197 remain unaffected.407 Despite such a mechanism available to the new employer 
to mitigate against onerous labour costs, in his capacity as a tenderer he will be 
taking a commercial risk which cannot properly be quantified. The outcome of such 
a mechanism will be unknown at the tendering stage. In addition, as argued 
previously, the tenderer’s access to the trade unions pre-transfer, and the assistance 
of the outgoing contractor, is limited in the competitive tendering process.408   
A further argument to counter the market manipulation is the potential ability 
of the new employer to dismiss the employees due to operational requirements. 
Despite s 187(1) (g) of the LRA, which states that: 
A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts 
contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is… a transfer, or a reason 
related to the transfer, contemplated in section 197 or s 197(A), 
it is recognised that genuine operational requirements may exist that necessitate the 
possible dismissal of parts of the acquired workforce.409 Recognising such an 
exception to s 187(1) (g) balances the employee’s right to job security and the right 
of a business to make commercial decisions ensuring its productivity and 
efficiency.410 When a dismissed employee that has been subject to a s 197 transfer 
claims an automatically unfair dismissal under s 187(1)(g) and ‘…the employer 
                                                
407 Ibid at 87. 
408 Op cit note 65 at 90. 
409  Van der Velde v Business and Design Software (Pty) Ltd and another (2006) 27 ILJ 1738 (LC) at 
1749 which was upheld on appeal in Business & Design Software (Pty) Ltd and another v Van der 
Velde (2009) 30 ILJ 1277. See Adams v Dcd- Dorbly Marine (Pty) Ltd (2011) 32 ILJ 2472 (LC) and 
Viney v Barnard Jacobs Mellet Securities (Pty) Ltd (2008) 29 ILJ 1564 (LC). For commentary see 
Craig Bosch ‘Operational Requirements Dismissals and Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act: 
Problems and Possibilities’ (2002) 23 ILJ 641 at 646.   
410 See comments by Judge Van Niekerk in Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409 at 1746 and 1747-
1749. Also see Bradley Workman-Davies ‘The Right of Employers to Dismiss Employees in the 
Context of Business Transfers - an Analysis of the Automatically Unfair Dismissal Provisions of the 














relies on a fair reason related to its operational requirements… ’,411  the Labour 
Court,412 supported by academic commentators,413 have applied a  
…two-stage test of factual and legal causation to determine whether the 
true reason for dismissal was the transfer itself, or a reason related to the employer's 
operational requirements.414 
It comprises two main questions: 
a) Factual Causation: Would the dismissal have occurred if there was no 
transfer in terms of s 197?415 If the answer is yes, the enquiry proceeds to 
the second question.416 If the answer is no, the dismissal is not 
automatically unfair and the court must examine the fairness of the 
dismissal in terms of s 188 read with s 189 of the LRA.417 
b) Legal Causation: Was the transfer or a reason related to it the dominant, 
proximate or most likely cause of the dismissal?418 If the answer is yes, 
                                                
411 Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409 at 1749. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Op cit note 18 at 166; Craig Bosch op cit note 409 at 646; Bradley Workman-Davies op cit note 
410 at 2146-2148 and Nicole Smit ‘A Chronicle of Issues Raised in the Course of Dismissals by the 
Transferor and/or Transferee in Circumstances Involving the Transfer of an Undertaking (2005) 26 
ILJ 1853 at 1873.  
414 Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409 at 1749. This two stage test is an adapted test from the case of 
SACWU V Afrox Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC) and is commonly referred to as the ‘Afrox Test.’ See 
commentary at op cit note 18 at 166. 
415 Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409 at 1749. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418 In respect of the question of legal causation, Judge Van Niekerk in Van der Velde (2006) supra 
note 409 at 1749 notably held that: 
If the test for factual causation is satisfied, the test for legal causation must be applied. Here, 
the court must determine whether the transfer is the main, dominant, proximate or most likely 
cause of the dismissal. This is an objective enquiry. The employer's motive for the dismissal, 
and how long before or after the transfer the employee was dismissed, are relevant but not 
determinative factors. 
 
If the reason for dismissal was not the transfer itself (because, for example, it was a dismissal 
effected in anticipation of a transfer and in response to the requirements of a potential 
purchaser of the business) the true reason may nonetheless be a reason related to the transfer. 
 
To answer this question (whether the reason was related to the transfer) the court must 
determine whether the dismissal was used by the employer as a means to avoid its 















the dismissal is automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1) (g). If the answer 
is no, the court must examine the fairness of the dismissal in terms of s 
188 read with s 189 of the LRA.419 
Despite this available remedy, its application in the outsourcing context is still 
relatively untested and lacks uniformity in its application. 420  These realities by 
implication expose the incoming contractor to the possibility of litigation. The 
uncertainty associated with such a mechanism may result in a reduction of tenders.   
If a new employer successfully dismisses based on operational requirements it 
will be liable for severance costs. These severance costs may put the new employer’s 
financial health at risk. However s 197 (7)421 compels the old employer to agree with 
                                                                                                                                     
evidence adduced by the employer that the true reason for dismissal is one related to its 
operational requirements, and where the employer's motive for the dismissal is only one of 
the factors that must be considered.)  
 
 If in this sense the employer used the dismissal to avoid its s 197 obligations, then the 
dismissal was related to the transfer.  
Also see Bradley Workman-Davies op cit note 410 at 2146. 
419 Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409 at 1749. 
420 Bradley Workman-Davies op cit note 410 at 2171. To illustrate, the case of Van der Velde (2006) 
supra note 409 concerned an employee’s retrenchment in light of a management buy-out. Adams 
(2011) supra note 409 concerned an employee’s retrenchment in light of the merger of two companies. 
Viney (2008) supra note 409 concerned an employee’s retrenchment in light of the merger of two 
companies. SA Municipal Workers Union (2005) supra note 50 concerned an outsourcing arrangement 
which occurred prior to the full development of the two stage enquiry test as set out in Van der Velde 
(2006) supra note 409. Buys (2008) supra note 50 concerned an employee’s retrenchment in the 
outsourcing context. The facts did not permit a finding that there was a transfer of a going concern, or 
assuming otherwise, that the dismissal fell with the ambit of s 187(1) (g).The judgment failed to 
account for the two stage enquiry test. Business and Design Software (Pty) Ltd (2009) supra note 409 
upheld the Labour Court’s findings, namely that of Van der Velde (2006) supra note 409,  and 
acknowledged the thorough judgment yet did not expressly or clearly apply the two stage test. 
421 Section 197(7) provides that: 
The old employer must - 
(a) agree with the new employer to a valuation as at the date of transfer of - 
(i) the leave pay accrued to the transferred employees of the old employer; 
(ii) the severance pay that would have been payable to the transferred 
employees of the old employer in the event of a dismissal by reason of the 
employer’s operational requirements; and 
(iii) any other payments that have accrued to the transferred employees but 
have not been paid to employees of the old employer. 
 (b) conclude a written agreement that specifies - 
(i) which employer is liable for paying any amount referred to in paragraph 
(a), and in the case of the apportionment of liability between them, the 















the new employer as to, inter alia, the value of the severance costs had the transferred 
employees been dismissed for operational requirements as of the date of the transfer.  
Section 197(8) regulates the non-compliance with s 197 (7). Failure to comply will 
cause the old employer to be jointly and severally liable with the new employer, for a 
period of up to 12 months form the date of transfer,  for severance costs owing to an 
employee due to his dismissal based on, inter alia, the new employer’s operational 
requirements.422  Todd et al argue that such a mechanism prevents an old employer 
from disposing of its workforce into ‘an unviable entity’423 in an attempt to avoid its 
liabilities to such employees had it retrenched them.424  
Bosch, in extracting an argument from an article by Wallis,425 proposes that an 
outgoing contractor could obstruct an agreement envisaged in s 197(7).426 The 
penalty imposed by s 197(8)427 to compel compliance by the old employer is 
insufficient as it is most likely that the retrenched employees would pursue such an 
action against the new employer.428 Wallis postulated such an argument against the 
application of s 197 to outsourcing.429 Wallis argued that the type of agreement 
envisaged in s 197(7) is premised on a consensual contractual relationship between 
the new employer and old employer.430 In the context of second generation 
                                                                                                                                     
(ii) what provision has been made for any payment contemplated in paragraph 
(a) if any employee becomes entitled to receive a payment; 
(c) disclose the terms of the agreement contemplated in paragraph (b) to each employee 
who after the transfer becomes employed by the new employer; and 
(d) take any other measure that may be reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that 
adequate provision is made for any obligation on the new employer that may arise in 
terms of paragraph (a). 
422 Section 197(8). See commentary in op cit note 18 at 89-90. 
423 Op cit note 18 at 90. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Wallis op cit note 51 at 13 
426 Op cit note 95 at 187. 
427 Section 197(8) provides that:- 
 For a period of 12 months after the date of the transfer, the old employer is jointly and 
severally liable with the new employer to any employee who becomes entitled to receive a 
payment contemplated in subsection (7) (a) as a result of the employee's dismissal for a 
reason relating to the employer's operational requirements or the employer's liquidation or 
sequestration, unless the old employer is able to show that it has complied with the 
provisions of this section. 
428 Wallis op cit note 51 at 13 and op cit note 95 at 187. 















outsourcing it is unrealistic to expect a ‘disgruntled contractor, which has just lost a 
valuable contract to a competitor’431 which, unlike in a sale of business is not 
financially benefiting from the appointment, to actively and willingly conclude an 
agreement which essentially seeks to apportion liability of payment between it and 
the new employer in respect of certain benefits that may accrue to the workforce 
from which it no longer derives any benefit.432 Based on such reasoning, Wallis 
argues that s 197 (7) flags the Legislature’s intention that transactions that triggers s 
197 are limited to where the new and old employers agree to bring about a change of 
ownership in the business, which is not the case in the outsourcing context.433 
Bosch clarifies the context in which Wallis’s above argument must be 
assessed.434 Section 197(7) is not discretionary.435 Despite the proposed reliance on 
the new employer for severance pay, old employers are still at risk and therefore it is 
in their interests to comply. In addition, in the event of non-compliance, the section 
could possibility be enforced by the Labour Court in terms of its general powers in s 
158(1)(b) and (j) of the LRA.436 Despite Bosch’s latter observation, a new employer 
and even the employees437 may still have a litigation battle in compelling an 
obstructive old employer to comply with the obligations imposed by s 197(7). 
It is argued that in the case of outsourcing, the outgoing contractor will be 
willing to enter into such an agreement that transfers all liability to the new 
employer, especially in the case of a ‘disgruntled contractor’ or contractor that 
purposively manipulated the market. Arguably the new employer would for 
commercial reasons want to hold the old employer liable for a portion of the 
liabilities as accommodated in s 197(7), especially in a situation proposed above 
where there is a manipulation of the market. Due to diverging interests and in the 




434 Op cit note 95 at 186. 
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absence of consensus, s 197 fails to provide a mechanism to compel agreement. Even 
if the Labour Court can force the old employer to enter into such agreement it cannot 
determine the details of the agreement.438 Todd et al argue that the new employer 
could possibility compel the old employer by way of a court order to bona fide make 
an effort to reach agreement.439 This arguably would entail legal costs and in no way 
guarantees any positive outcome as to the terms of the agreement. 
In the absence of agreement s 197(8) would automatically apply.440 As was 
argued by Wallis, there may be a tendency for employees to pursue the claim against 
the new employer without regard to the old employer.441 Conversely if the new 
employer’s financial viability is at risk, it would be more probable that an informed 
employee would pursue the claim against the old employer. Nevertheless the new 
employer is still potentially liable. 
The above reflects the limited application of the potential mechanisms to 
counter the practical implication of a manipulation of the market by an old employer. 
Despite the possible remedies available to the new employer to mitigate against 
onerous labour costs, in his capacity as a tenderer he will be taking a commercial risk 
which cannot properly be quantified as the outcome of such remedies available by s 
189, s 197(7) and s 197(8) will be unknown at that stage.  
Without certain and effective countering mechanisms, a contractor can 
dominate the market in which it operates, leaving the client stuck with the same 
contractor indefinitely (unless it insources and absorbs the associated costs),442 or, if 
proven to be prolific in practice, can reduce the trend of outsourcing.  This type of 
market manipulation it is submitted would be financially sustainable by larger 
outsourcing business, compared to that of SMMEs. This type of practice contributes 
to the suppression of the growth of SMMEs.   
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4.3. LACK OF EMPIRICAL INFORMATION 
The above practical implications reflect a common theme – the negative impact on 
the competitiveness and viability of the outsourcing sector by eroding fair 
competition. In countering such a theme Bosch argues that no evidence has emerged 
from comparable provisions in other countries to warrant the credibility of such a 
conclusion.443 It is respectfully submitted that this is not a sufficient basis on which 
to dismiss the possible effects of s 197 in the outsourcing sector in the South African 
context. South Africa is a third world economy. It is plausible that the effects of s 
197 in the outsourcing context in South Africa will not be comparable to its counter 
parts in developed economies. That is not to dismiss the need for a comprehensive 
investigation into the perceived vs actual implications of s 197. However to reduce 
the credibility of the potential implications without considering the South African 
context in which it operates seems to be a convenient reliance on the fact that there is 
lack of empirical evidence in other jurisdictions. 
4.4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN WHICH S 197 
OPERATES 
It is respectfully submitted that it not unreasonable to have expected the 
Constitutional Court in SAA to have examined the suitability of the nature of the 
outsourcing business relationship prior to its pronouncement that s 197 may be 
applicable to second generation outsourcing.  The Labour Appeal Court in the 2013 
case of PE Pack 4100CC v Adam Sanders, Cell C Provider Company (Pty) 
(hereinafter referred to as PE Pack)444 pronounced on the application of franchising 
agreements to s 197.445 The issue of law before the Labour Appeal Court was 
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whether s 197 applied to franchise agreements.446 The Court’s decision was 
influenced by the nature of the business model of a franchise undertaking. It 
determined that franchising agreements were excluded from the scope of s 197 based 
on the specific relationship structure that comprise a franchising agreement. 447  
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:-448 Cell C, operating its business 
by means of a franchise model, cancelled franchise agreements concluded between it 
and the third and fourth respondents.449  It concluded a franchising agreement with 
the appellant, a new franchisee.450 The latter franchise agreement related to the same 
infrastructure and services that formed the subject matter of the terminated franchise 
agreements.451 On the facts Cell C held the leases in respect of the business premises, 
which it subleased to its franchisees.452 Cell C further owned the fittings and 
furniture within the shops.453 Franchisees of Cell C in turned owned the stock in store 
and were responsible for the supply of related customer services.454 On the facts the 
exiting franchisees retained ownership of their stock.455   
In essence, the Cell C stores which were previously run by the third and 
fourth respondents were, following the termination of their franchise agreements, 
being run by the appellant. The employment contracts of the employees of the third 
and fourth respondents were not taken over by the appellant. 456 
 Following the appointment of the appellant, an employee of the third and 
fourth respondents sought an order in the court a quo457 that the takeover of the 
business of the third and fourth respondents by Cell C or the new franchisee 
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constituted a s197 transfer. 458 The court a quo, adopting a purposive approach,459 
held inter alia that the takeover of the business of the exiting franchisees by the new 
franchisee amounted to a s 197 transfer.460 It found that the business remained the 
same pre and post transfer.461 
Taken on appeal, PE Pack defined the ambit of the dispute as whether s 197 
applies to franchise agreements.462 The judgment centred on the nature of the 
franchise business model.463 The court identified deeming characteristics of a 
franchise relationship,464 the prominent feature being the limited autonomy of the 
franchisee due to the high level of control exercised by the franchisor.465  
In upholding the appeal,466 the court determined that there was no transfer of 
a business as a going concern.467  It held that no business had transferred. There was 
only a termination of a license to operate a business.468 The franchisor retained 
ownership of the entire infrastructure at the time of termination of the franchise 
agreement and at the time of the appointment of the appellant.469 As the ownership of 
the assets remained intact there could not be a transfer of a business as a going 
concern.470  As such the nature of the franchise agreement excluded the application 
of s 197. 
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The court cautioned against applying ‘outsourcing “jurisprudence’471 to the 
franchising sector.472  In considering the relationship dynamics within a franchising 
arrangement, specifically with reference to the dominant and controlling role of the 
franchisor, and the retention of ownership of the infrastructure by the franchisor, the 
court distinguished the franchise arrangement to that of the outsourcing facts of SAA. 
473  
In taking cognisance of the relationship dynamics and commercial structures 
which define a franchising arrangement, PE Pack reflects a shift in approach by the 
Labour Appeal Court.  PE Pack moves away from a purposive approach as applied 
not only by the court a quo, but as readily adopted by others courts including the 
Constitutional Court.474 Instead it has adopted an approach that has capped the 
application of s 197 on account of the commercial dynamics and realities of a 
transaction in the determination of the possible application of s 197. This type of 
approach which accounts for the nuances of a type of transaction as opposed to an 
outright purposive approach to s 197, in isolation of the economic context in which it 
operates, is what is required in order to accommodate the implications of the 
application of s 197 to outsourcing transactions. 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Law is dynamic. The business environment is constantly evolving to the needs of the 
modern commercial world. In the context of outsourcing, the formulation of s 197 
needs to responsive to the nuanced business structures of the modern economy. If s 
197 fails to evolve, however insurmountable that task may seem, the protection it 
provides for short term job security can undermine the long term protection of job 
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security and stunt the contributory role of the outsourcing sector in South Africa’s 
economic growth.475 
This chapter is by no means deemed an exhaustive list of the practical 
problems associated with the application of s 197 in the outsourcing context.  It 
purpose is to draw attention to the limitations of the application of the provisions in s 
197, in the outsourcing context, specifically second generation and future generation 
outsourcing transactions, and the broader economic implications of such limitations. 
These limitations hinder the smooth transition of a business for an old employer to a 
new employer. Such an outcome counters the intended dual purpose of s 197 as 
stated in UCT.476  Consequently such a failure negatively impacts s 197’s delicate 
balancing act of regulating conflicting interests, namely the business interests of 
employers and the employee’s interest in job security.477    
The ‘type and characteristics’ of the market in which s 197 operates should 
have been accounted for in SAA.478 The Constitutional Court’s omission in 
examining the specific relationship structures that exists in a second generation 
outsourcing relationship has resulted in a failure to judicially recognise the 
unsuitability of certain identified assumptions that appear to underlie the implications 
and remedies of and within s 197. For example, the assumption that an incoming 
contractor will have the same financial capabilities of the outgoing contractor, and 
the assumption that there exists a consensual and cooperative outgoing contractor 
despite the absence of any contractual obligation or incentive.  At the very least such 
an acknowledgement by SAA would have focused attention on the practical 
implications of s 197 to the outsourcing industry and incentivised the Legislature to 
begin the process to amend s 197. The current state of affairs creates a controversial 
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imbalance between the economic rights and concerns of the contractors and the right 
of employees to job security.479 
 
  
                                                
479 Stephen Hardy and Nick Adnett ‘‘Entrepreneurial Freedom Versus Employee Rights’: the 
Acquired Rights Directive and EU Social Policy Post – Amsterdam’ (1999) 9 Journal of European 
Social Policy 127 at 135 in which the authors make a similar comment in respect of the ETO defence 














 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The words of Advocate General Geelhoed,480 in his examination of the applicability 
of the EU Directive to the outsourcing context in light of Süzen, succinctly 
encapsulate the concerns addressed in this paper: 
On account of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of [outsourcing], the Court 
must, in my view, be reticent in regard to the application of the directive in the case 
of changes of contract. The dynamics of the market might be disrupted if the 
existence of a transfer within the meaning of the directive were assumed too readily. 
The obligation to respect the rights of all the members of staff of a company solely 
on the basis of the take over of a contract and the take over of a proportion of 
existing staff will give a potential new contractor less incentive to pick up the 
contract. Undertakings might even be deterred from competing for the contract. All 
this could lead to the ossification of markets.481 
and, 
… if the service provider is required too readily to take over the entire staff, the 
objective of the directive will become disproportionate in relation to the principle of 
freedom of contract and of freedom to engage in business activities.482 
As has been argued in chapter two there are identifiable interpretational 
issues in the judgment of SAA that may possibility affect the scope of the application 
of s 197 to seco d generation outsourcing, and future outsourcing. These issues will 
undoubtedly be subject to future litigation. Chapter three focused on the reasoning 
anomaly when applying the going concern enquiry in the context of outsourcing. 
This presents an ironic situation. SAA sought to promote the purpose of s 197 by the 
potential application of s 197 to an outsourcing transaction.483 However the 
application of a court approved enquiry in UCT has the ability to undermine the very 
purpose which SAA sought to promote. Chapter four highlighted the practical 
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implications of the present formulation of s 197 in the outsourcing business 
environment. It was shown how the dynamics within and the structure of an 
outsourcing relationship is incompatible with the mechanisms provided in s 197 
which neglect to subtly cater and account for the new employer’s business needs. 
This discord fails to achieve the dual purpose of s 197 in facilitating ‘…commercial 
transactions while at the same time protecting the workers against unfair job 
losses’.484 The purpose of protecting job security overrides the commercial 
considerations within the outsourcing context. If the dual purpose of s 197 is not 
achieved, there is arguably no consideration of the conflicting tensions which the 
dual purpose delicately balances, namely the  
… clash between, on the one hand, the employer’s interest in the profitability, 
efficiency or survival of the business, or if need be its effective disposal of it, and the 
worker’s interest in job security and the right to freely choose an employer on the 
other hand.485 
It is argued that intervention by the courts and Legislature is required. The 
courts need to address the reasoning anomalies present in the outsourcing context. 
The Legislature needs to intervene and amend s 197 to account for the economic 
context in which second generation outsourcing, and future generation outsourcing, 
operates. It is the opinion of this paper that s 197 will become user-friendly once the 
deficiencies in the going concern enquiry are addressed, and the business structure 
and relationship dynamics associated with outsourcing are accommodated within s 
197. In the face of certainty its application to outsourcing will become an accepted 
and quantifiable commercial risk associated with outsourcing and not one shrouded 
in controversy.  
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